1 2 3	STATE OF NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT
4 5 6 7	IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF HARRY R. BARNES TO ASSESSMENT ISSUED UNDER LETTER ID NO. L1183035056
8	v. AHO Case Number 22.05-029A, D&O No 22-025
9	NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT
10 11	DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR TAXPAYER
12	This matter came before the Administrative Hearings Office, Hearing Officer Chris
13	Romero, Esq., upon a Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Fees Under Section 7-1-29.1
14	("Motion") of Mr. Harry Barnes, Jr. ("Taxpayer"). The Motion was filed on September 13, 2022
15	pursuant to the Tax Administration Act and the Administrative Hearings Office Act. Taxpayer is
16	represented by Mr. Frank Crociata, Esq. The Taxation and Revenue Department ("Department")
17	is represented by Ms. Cordelia Friedman, Esq. The Department, by and through Ms. Friedman,
18	filed Department's Response to Taxpayer's Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting that
19	Motion be Denied ("Response") on September 27, 2022. A hearing on the Motion occurred on
20	December 6, 2022.
21	The facts and legal issues presented concentrate on whether Taxpayer is entitled to recoup a
22	portion of costs and fees expended in defense of an assessment which Taxpayer alleges was
23	unsupported by evidence at the time it was issued. Because the Hearing Officer agrees that under
24	the facts presented, Taxpayer is entitled to relief under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-29.1,
25	Taxpayer's motion and protest should be granted. IT IS DECIDED AND ORDERED AS
26	FOLLOWS:
27	FINDINGS OF FACT
	In the Matter of the Protest of Harry R. Barnes

Taxpayer's Motion presented 23 statements of undisputed material fact. The Department did not contest facts corresponding with statement numbers 1, 5 - 10, 12 - 14, and 16 - 22. [See Motion; Response (Page 4 - Section II)]

With respect for the balance, representing statement numbers 2 – 4, 11, 15, and 23, the Department asserts that it has insufficient information with which to admit or deny the asserted fact. These facts will also be deemed as true and uncontested. *See Carrillo v. Hoyl*, 1973-NMCA-149, ¶ 4, 85 N.M. 751, 752, 517 P.2d 73, 74. Although relying on "insufficient information" is a common and acceptable method of responding to the factual allegations in a complaint under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts (Rule 1-008 B), the same cannot be said of the burden placed on a non-moving party in contesting material facts presented in support for a motion for summary judgment.

Although favored procedurally, a non-moving party cannot rely solely on the allegations contained in its complaint or upon mere argument or contention to defeat a motion once a prima facie showing has been made. *See Oschwald v. Christie*, 1980-NMSC-136, ¶ 6, 95 N.M. 251, 253, 620 P.2d 1276, 1278.

The non-movant "must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact by way of sworn affidavits, depositions, and similar evidence." *See Juneau v. Intel Corp.*, 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 12, 17, 127 P.3d 548, 553; *Archuleta v. Goldman*, 1987-NMCA-049, ¶ 11, 107 N.M. 547, 551, 761 P.2d 425, 429 (a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must come forward with evidence to refute assertions of fact). Mere assertions of insufficient information with which to admit or deny fail to establish the existence of disputed material facts.

Material Facts

1. Taxpayer and Sarah L. Barnes ("Mrs. Barnes") are a married couple. [See Exhibit

¹ Although the name of the law firm is contained in the record, the Hearing Officer finds that referring to the law firm by name is not necessary to the discussion contained herein.

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1	September 16, 2020; correspondence acknowledging the protest under Letter ID No.
2	L0053273008 dated January 29, 2021; and a Notice of Abatement of Tax Assessment dated
3	April 26, 2021 under Letter ID No. L2063145392. [Administrative File]
4	29. On June 16, 2022, the Administrative Hearings Office entered an Order Denying
5	Motion to Consolidate and Notice of Telephonic Scheduling Hearing. According to the order, the
6	request for consolidation was denied for the following reason:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	The Request for Hearing was accompanied by a Motion to Consolidate Re: Administrative Fees ("Motion") also filed on May 27, 2022. The Motion sought to consolidate the above-captioned protest with Case No. 21.12-070A which was the subject of D&O 22-14 entered on May 25, 2022. The Department opposed the Motion. Given the procedural status of the latter, the request to consolidate at this time is DENIED in order to maintain a clear record for the potential appeal of D&O 22-14 and to avoid any confusion or uncertainty regarding the timeframes for perfecting an appeal under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25. See Gelinas v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2020-NMCA-038, ¶6, 472 P.3d 1231, 1234, cert. denied (May 11, 2020) ("[T]he rule governing a direct appeal of a hearing officer's decision establishes the filing timeline based on the issuance of the decision and order.")
20	30. The Department filed Department's Answer to Protest on June 27, 2022.
21	[Administrative File]
22	31. A telephonic scheduling hearing occurred on July 15, 2022 at which time the
23	parties agreed that the hearing satisfied the 90-day hearing requirement established by the
24	Administrative Hearings Office Act. [Administrative File]
25	32. On July 15, 2022, the Administrative Hearings Office entered a Dispositive
26	Motion Briefing Schedule. [Administrative File]
27	33. Taxpayer filed his Motion on September 13, 2022. The Department filed its
28	Response on September 27, 2022. [Administrative File]
29	34. On October 5, 2022, the Administrative Hearings Office entered a Notice of
30	Videoconference Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment. [Administrative File]

Some introduction is helpful prior to addressing that particular issue. Section 7-1-29.1(A) provides that a taxpayer shall be awarded "reasonable administrative costs" incurred in any "administrative proceeding" brought by or against the taxpayer and conducted in connection with determination of any tax, penalty, or interest when the tax at issue is governed by the Tax Administration Act and the taxpayer is the "prevailing party."

First, "administrative proceeding" means "any procedure or other action before the Department or the administrative hearings office." See Section 7-1-29.1 (B) (1) (emphasis added). Second, a taxpayer is the "prevailing party" if the taxpayer has either: (a) substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy; or (b) substantially prevailed with respect to most legal issues, or the most significant legal issues, involved in the case. See Section 7-1-29.1 (C) (1) (a) & (b). Third, "reasonable administrative costs," means, among other things, the actual charges for fees and costs paid or incurred for attorney services in connection with the administrative proceeding. See Section 7-1-29.1 (B) (3) (b).

The undisputed facts establish that Mr. Barnes and Ms. Sarah L. Barnes are a married couple. They filed joint federal and New Mexico personal income tax returns for tax years 2015 through 2017. Concurrent with a significant portion of those years, from October of 2012 through February of 2016, Mrs. Barnes was employed by a law firm, and in that capacity, she represented the law firm's clients before the SSA.

On April 2, 2020, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Assess-Gross Receipts and commenced an audit of Mr. Barnes' purported gross receipts. The intent to audit arose from the Department's detection of a Schedule C mismatch for tax years 2015 through 2017.

The mismatch arose from the detection of income reported on Taxpayer's Schedule C which was not also reported on Taxpayer's CRS-1s in the same tax periods. Further evaluation of

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21 22 the facts at the time determined that the income included in the Schedule C, but not reported for gross receipts tax purposes, was attributable to compensation seemingly³ paid to Mrs. Barnes by the SSA as reported on Forms 1099, as well as by the State of New Mexico for reasons attributed to her service in the New Mexico Legislature.

Having received the Notice of Intent to Assess-Gross Receipts, Mr. Barnes worked and communicated directly with Ms. Debbie Rael, employee of the Department, to resolve the matter. As of May of 2020, it was undisputed that Mr. Barnes informed Ms. Rael by email and telephone that the SSA 1099s, while incorrect (discussed in Decision and Order 22-14), related to Mrs. Barnes' employment with the law firm and, more precisely, her representation of its clients before the SSA. In other words, they were not in any way related to Mr. Barnes' business activities in New Mexico. Communications on this subject occurred through August of 2020 and were acknowledged by Ms. Rael, who in response to information provided by Mr. Barnes (Exhibit 3.2 to Motion), made various adjustments and then noted, "The remaining discrepancies are related to the SSA – 1099s[,]" which clearly identified Mrs. Barnes, not Mr. Barnes, as the recipient of income. [Administrative File (Hearing Request – Exhibit No. 3).

Despite the foregoing, the Department assessed \$17,258.28 against Mr. Barnes individually. The assessment consisted of \$12,475.46 in gross receipts tax, \$2,495.09 in penalty, and \$2,287.73 in interest issued under Letter ID L1183035056 and dated September 16, 2020. At this point, the Hearing Officer will also emphasize that the assessment was for gross receipts tax, *not* personal income tax.

Mr. Barnes filed a protest of the assessment on December 15, 2020, and supplemented the protest on April 1, 2021. Mr. Barnes asserted that the assessment was "illegal and erroneous"

³ Additional details are contained in Decision and Order No. 22-14 which may explain the Hearing Officer's use of this particular adjective.

because none of the money which formed the basis for the assessment derived from his business activities in New Mexico, and for that reason, were not his gross receipts.

In mid-April of 2021, after an informal conference, the Department abated the assessment against Mr. Barnes. Although Mr. Barnes suggested that the assessment merely be amended to identify the correct taxpayer, in this case, Mrs. Barnes, the Department abated the assessment in full and then generated a new assessment against Mrs. Barnes. The Department never explained why it declined the suggestion. Once again, the assessment against Mrs. Barnes was protested and subject of Decision and Order 22-14.

Given the summarized facts, the Hearing Officer agrees that Taxpayer meets the definition of prevailing party for two reasons. First, Mr. Barnes prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy. The Department abated the entire assessment against him. *See Helmerich & Payne*, 2019-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 20, 21 (Department abatement issued before an AHO hearing confers prevailing party status on a taxpayer). Second, Mr. Barnes also prevailed with respect to the most significant legal issue in his case, which was whether the alleged tax base constituted taxable gross receipts to Mr. Barnes and was therefore pursued against the correct taxpayer.

Yet, Section 7-1-29.1, contains an exception to the rule. If the Department's position in the administrative proceeding was based on a reasonable application of law to the facts of the case, then the taxpayer's status as prevailing party will afford no relief. *See* Section 7-1-29.1 (C) (2). The Department bears the burden of proof on this issue. *See Helmerich & Payne*, 2019-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 25, 26.

Under Section 7-1-29.1 (C) (2), the Department's position is statutorily presumed not to constitute a reasonable application of law to the facts of the case under two circumstances. First, the Department's position cannot be reasonable if the Department failed to follow its own

published regulations, information releases, instructions, technical advice memoranda, announcements, or private letter rulings or letters issued to the taxpayer in the proceeding. *See* Section 7-1-29 (C) (2) (a) & (3) (deeming the position unreasonable if the Department fails to follow applicable published guidance). Second, the Department's position cannot be reasonable if the assessment giving rise to the administrative proceeding is not supported by substantial evidence, determined at the time of the issuance of the assessment. *See* Section 7-1-29.1 (C) (2) (b).

In essence, Section 7-1-29.1 provides taxpayers a remedy for having to defend themselves against an unreasonable assessment or Departmental overreach. *See Helmerich & Payne*, 2019-NMCA-054, ¶ 12. Nothing in the statute pardons Departmental inadvertence, lack of care, or inattentiveness.

If the Department's assessment was not supported by substantial evidence at the time the assessment was issued, the Department's position in the proceeding is not reasonable. If the Department does not follow its own published guidance in the proceeding, its position is not reasonable. Finally, even if neither presumption is met, the statute compels a fee award if AHO determines that the position the Department maintains in the proceeding is not a reasonable application of law to the facts of the case.

At the time it issued the assessment against Mr. Barnes, the Department had actual knowledge that the gross receipts underlying the assessment derived from Forms 1099 that the SSA had issued to Mrs. Barnes rather than to Mr. Barnes.

In other words, the Department knew, from previous communications with Mr. Barnes, before it issued the assessment that: (a) none of the alleged tax base constituted taxable gross

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receipts to Mr. Barnes; and (b) all of the gross receipts at issue, if ultimately taxable, belonged to a different taxpayer – Mrs. Barnes.

At first blush, one may be disinclined to perceive a husband and wife as distinct and separate taxpayers under the New Mexico Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, but this has long been the rule in New Mexico. In 2012, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that only the person engaging in business and generating "gross receipts" at issue is the "taxpayer" for GRT purposes. See Breen v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMCA-101, ¶31, 287 P.3d 379. In *Breen*, the court rejected the Department's attempts to treat a husband (a state employee) as the GRT "taxpayer" with respect to gross receipts his wife (an attorney) generated from her legal practice. *Id*. The court rejected the proposition that the husband was the "taxpayer" because the couple filed joint income tax returns or on notions of community property. Id.; See also New Mexico Depo v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2021-NMCA-011, ¶ 11, 485 P.3d 773, 776 (the single-member limited liability company is the liable taxpayer for GRT, not the single member in her individual capacity).

At the time of the assessment, the Department had no evidence that the alleged tax base constituted gross receipts to Mr. Barnes. In fact, communications leading up to the assessment provided actual notice that the alleged tax base could only be gross receipts of Mrs. Barnes, not Mr. Barnes. The Department's subsequent conduct seemingly reaffirmed that fact in that the Department fully abated the assessment against Mr. Barnes and issued a new assessment to Mrs. Barnes, based on the same alleged gross receipts. See D&O 22-014.

Mr. Barnes does not challenge the Department's policy of initiating GRT audits by reviewing a married couple's joint income tax returns. However, his request for fee recovery falls squarely within the language, purpose, and spirit of Section 7-1-29.1. In practical effect, Mr.

Barnes has had to incur legal expenses to avoid being held liable for GRT on monies that do not constitute "gross receipts" to him under law, that bear no relationship whatsoever to his business activities, and that the Department knew, before it issued the assessment, directly stemmed from Mrs. Barnes' work as an attorney employed by Law Firm.

The Hearing Officer agrees that the assessment against Mr. Barnes was not supported by substantial evidence at the time it was issued.

Mr. Barnes emphasized his pre-abatement suggestion to the Department that it amend the assessment against him to identify Mrs. Barnes as the correct taxpayer. The Department indicated that it could not do that, but that a new assessment against Mrs. Barnes would be required. It is unclear exactly why the Department could not amend the assessment as the Department provided no citation or explanation for that position. In making this observation, the Hearing Officer does not suggest any error with the Department's stance, only that its foundation is not articulated and the Hearing Officer will refrain from speculation on that question. The Hearing Officer notes that the Notice of Intent was addressed collectively to Mr. and Mrs. Barnes, but for reasons not readily apparent from the record, the assessment for GRT omitted Mrs. Barnes and focused exclusively on the individual it knew would not be liable for the tax. See Exhibit 3.2 – 3.3 (noting that after adjustments, all "remaining discrepancies are related to the SSA – 1099s.").

The Hearing Officer notices Ms. Rodriguez's sworn affidavit in which she explains, "At the time the Department assessed Mr. Barnes, it did not know his role in the spouse's business(es)." *See* Exhibit A to Response, ¶10. The Hearing Officer finds this statement unpersuasive. Exhibit 3 to the Motion contains a clear and concise explanation of the relevant facts to Ms. Rael, the employee at the Department with whom Mr. Barnes was communicating

regarding the issues, and who had authority to make appropriate adjustments. *See* Exhibit 3.2 to Motion. In this regard, Ms. Rael was the most competent witness to testify with respect to what she knew, and by extension, what the Department knew, at the time of the assessment. Ms. Rodriguez is highly qualified and respected but her testimony on this fact is speculative and unpersuasive because she cannot reliably testify to what Ms. Rael knew.

The Department also avers that its "initial review of the facts and evidence led its auditors to reasonably attribute the reported income on Taxpayer's SSA Federal Forms 1099-MISC to Taxpayer's wife, and by extension to him as the primary taxpayer on the married couple's jointly filed" income tax returns. Quite candidly, the Department's explanation corroborates Taxpayer's assertion that when the Department issued the assessment, it knew Mr. Barnes had no association to the income reported by the SSA for the years in question and was not the "taxpayer" under the rationale in *Breen*.

Regardless, the Department attributed one spouse's gross receipts to the other spouse based solely on the fact that the couple filed joint income tax returns and Mr. Barnes' name appeared first⁴ in those returns. There is simply no known New Mexico authority in support of this proposition. In fact, all authority provides otherwise.

Thus, there is simply no authority in New Mexico for establishing gross receipts tax liability by one spouse through an assessment against the other. "[O]nly those persons who engage in business can be held liable for the gross receipts tax." *See Breen*, 2012-NMCA-101, ¶31. *See* Section 7-9-2 (levying a tax on the privilege of engaging in certain activities in New Mexico); Section 7-9-4(A) (imposing GRT on the "gross receipts" of persons engaging in business); Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (defining what activities generate "gross receipts"); NMAC

⁴ Form 1040, for example only, does not refer to a "primary" or "secondary" taxpayer. For married couples filing jointly, it merely designates them in terms of "you" and "your spouse."

3.2.4.8 and 3.2.6.9 ((both stating that GRT is imposed on the person engaging in business and reiterating that the person conducting the taxable activities is "solely liable" for the tax); FYI-105, Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax – An Overview, at 5 ("the tax is imposed on the gross receipts of persons who conduct" the activities described in Section 7-9-3.5(A)).

In fact, given such authority, the Department's assessment against Mr. Barnes is also unreasonable under Section 7-1-29.1 (C) (2) (a) because the Department did not adhere to its regulations and publications governing the imposition and liability for gross receipts tax.

In summary, the Department cannot meet its burden under Section 7-1-29.1. From an evidentiary perspective, the Department knew, before it issued the assessment, that the receipts reflected in the Forms 1099 from the SSA did not report "gross receipts" paid to or received by Mr. Barnes. Instead, the assessment to Mr. Barnes was based on the couple's filing of joint income tax returns contrary to *Breen* and the Department's published regulations and guidance, all of which identify the person liable for GRT as the person who engaged in the activities that generated the receipts. The assessment was, therefore, not supported by substantial evidence at the time it was issued.

Therefore, the Taxpayer has established entitlement to recoup a portion of his cost and fees at the lesser of 20 percent of the amount of the settlement or judgment or \$75,000. *See* Section 7-1-29.1(E).

Here, the Department assessed \$17,258.28 against Mr. Barnes and later abated the entire assessment. The abatement amount comprises the judgment amount. *See Helmerich & Payne*, 2019-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 2, 29-31 (allowing fees at the then-existing cap of \$50,000, which was less

⁵ Mr. Barnes emphasizes that his actual costs and fees of more than \$19,000.00 far exceed the requested amount.

1	G. The sum of \$3,451.66 represents 20 percent of the amount originally assessed.
2	See Section 7-1-29.1 E.
3	H. "This taxpayer right is not dispensable. The statute says that a taxpayer 'shall' be
4	awarded costs if it is the prevailing party. Section 7-1-29.1(A). The Department thus does not have
5	the discretion to, in effect, deny costs to a prevailing-party taxpayer." See Helmerich, 2019-
6	NMCA-054, ¶13.
7	For the reasons stated, Taxpayer's protest is GRANTED and he "shall be awarded a
8	judgmentfor reasonable administrative costs and reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees
9	incurred in connection with the proceeding" in the amount of \$3,451.66 pursuant to NMSA
10	1978, Section 7-1-29.1.
11	DATED: December 22, 2022
12 13 14 15 16 17	Chris Romero Hearing Officer Administrative Hearings Office P.O. Box 6400 Santa Fe, NM 87502

Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this decision by *filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals* within 30 days of the date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing statement from the appealing party. *See* Rule 12-209 NMRA.

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I served the foregoing on the parties listed below this 22 nd day of
3	December 2022 in the following manner:
4	First Class Mail and Email First Class Mail and Email
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6	INTENTIONALLY BLANK