1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE 3 TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT 4 IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF 5 M&J OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC TO THE ASSESSMENT ISSUED UNDER 6 7 **LETTER ID NO. L1745543856** 8 AHO No. 20.04-052A, v. 9 D&O No. 20-16 10 NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 11 **DECISION AND ORDER** 12 On November 20, 2020, Hearing Officer Dee Dee Hoxie, Esq. conducted a hearing by 13 videoconference on the merits of the protest to the assessment. The Taxation and Revenue 14 Department (Department) was represented by Kenneth Fladager, Staff Attorney. Nicholas 15 Pacheco, Auditor, also appeared on behalf of the Department. M&J Oilfield Services, LLC 16 (Taxpayer) was represented by its attorneys, James Feuille and David Hansen. Jesus Michael 17 Carrasco, owner of the Taxpayer (Owner), also appeared for the hearing. Michael Carrasco (Father), Elena Carrasco (Mother), and Aundrea Bradshaw also appeared as witnesses for the 18 19 Taxpayer. The Owner, his Father and Mother, Ms. Bradshaw, and Mr. Pacheco testified. The 20 Hearing Officer took notice of all documents in the administrative file. The Taxpayer's exhibits 21 #1 (financial transfer), #2 (tax return), #3 (balance sheet), #4 (trailer receipts), #5 (MVD 22 records), #6 (titles and insurance), #7 (articles of organization), #8 (employee list), #9 (W-2 23 information), #10 (schedule C), #11 (emails), #12 (assessment), #13 (pictures), #14 (business 24 names list), #15 (equipment list), #16 (customer list), #18 (dates of employment), and #19 25 (employee lists) were admitted. The Department's exhibits A (UCC financing statement), B 26 (MVD records), C (employee records), D (W-2 records), E (gross receipts report), F (gross M&J Oilfield Services, LLC

receipts report), G (subcontractors list), H (assessment), I (acknowledgment of protest), J (business tax application), K (registration certificate), and L (business tax registration update) were admitted. A more detailed description of exhibits submitted at the hearing is included on the Administrative Exhibit Coversheet.

The main issue to be decided is whether the Taxpayer is a successor in business, and, if so, to what extent the Taxpayer is liable. The Hearing Officer considered all of the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. The Hearing Officer finds that the Taxpayer is a successor in business and that the Taxpayer's liability is limited to the full value of the transferred property. IT IS DECIDED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. On October 21, 2019, under letter id. no. L1745543856, the Department issued an assessment to the Taxpayer as a successor in business to M & J Dumptruck and Backhoe Services, Inc. The assessment was for tax of \$2,610,552.42, penalty of \$523,189.48, and interest of \$565,397.29, for a total liability of \$3,699,139.19. [Administrative file, Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Testimony of Owner, Exhibit 12].
- 2. On January 17, 2020, the Taxpayer filed a timely protest to the assessment. [Administrative file, Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Testimony of Owner].
- 3. On January 31, 2020, the Department acknowledged receipt of the Taxpayer's protest. [Administrative file].
- 4. On April 13, 2020, the Taxpayer filed a request for hearing with the Administrative Hearings Office. [Administrative file].
- 5. On April 16, 2020, the Administrative Hearings Office sent notice of a telephonic scheduling hearing to the parties. [Administrative file].

- 15. For insurance purposes at the time that the Taxpayer acquired the heavy equipment, it was valued at \$57,949.93, including tax. [Exhibit 1.14].
- 16. The Taxpayer calculated the heavy equipment's value at \$54,583.08, excluding tax. [Testimony of the Owner, Exhibit 1.14].
- 17. The Dumptruck business was owned by the Father. The Father also had another business called M & J Rentals and Oilfield Services, LLC (the Rentals business) and operated a farming business (the farm). [Testimony of the Owner, Testimony of the Father, Testimony of the Mother, Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw].
- 18. The Dumptruck business provided services to oilfield companies. The Dumptruck business's services were building large pads for rigs, building tank batteries, and maintenance service on the tank battery lines. [Testimony of the Father].
- 19. The Rentals business rented equipment to its customers. [Testimony of the Father, Testimony of the Mother].
- 20. The Rentals business did not rent equipment to the Dumptruck business because the Dumptruck business owned its own equipment. [Testimony of the Father, Testimony of the Mother].
- 21. The Dumptruck business was assessed by the Department in September 2014, and it protested the assessment. The protest was later withdrawn. [Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Exhibit H, Exhibit I].
- 22. In November 2014, the Owner's sister was diagnosed with cancer, and the Father and Mother began neglecting their businesses to spend most of their time with their daughter so they could assist with her medical treatment. As a result, the problems with the Dumptruck

- 30. The Dumptruck business tried to sell its vehicles but was unable to sell them due to a lien filed by the Department. [Testimony of the Father, Exhibit 13].
- 31. As the Dumptruck business failed, it began terminating its employees.

 [Testimony of the Father, Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw, Exhibit 18].
- 32. In 2016, the Taxpayer hired approximately 27 former employees of the Dumptruck business. [Testimony of the Owner, Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw, Exhibit 8, Exhibit 18, Exhibit 19, Exhibit C].
- 33. Some of those employees left the Taxpayer's service the same year that they were hired, some remained for a few years, and a few still work for the Taxpayer. [Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw, Exhibit 8].
- 34. In 2018, the Father began working for the Taxpayer. [Testimony of the Father, Testimony of the Owner, Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw, Exhibit 9, Exhibit 18, Exhibit C, Exhibit D].
- 35. In total, the Dumptruck business employed approximately 71 employees over the years, the Taxpayer has employed approximately 38¹ employees over the years, and approximately 28 of those employees worked for both. [Testimony of Ms. Bradshaw, Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Exhibit 19, Exhibit C].
- 36. The shared employees amount to approximately 39%² of the Dumptruck business's total workforce and to approximately 74% of the Taxpayer's total workforce³. [Testimony of Mr. Pacheco, Exhibit 19, Exhibit C].

¹ The Taxpayer's count is 39 employees in Exhibit 19, but the Department's count is 38 employees in Exhibit C. The Taxpayer's count of shared employees and of employees of the Dumptruck business is the same as the Department's count.

² That is 28 out 71 employees.

³ That is 28 out of 38 employees.

Department to show that the assessment is correct. *See MPC Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMCA-21, ¶13, 133 N.M. 217.

Successor in Business Liability.

A successor in business is required to pay the tax for which the acquired business was liable. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-61 (C) (2017). *See also* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63 (1997). Moreover, "tangible and intangible property used in any business remains subject to liability for payment of the tax due" even when the business is transferred to a new owner. NMSA 1978, § 7-1-61 (B). A successor in business is charged with certain responsibilities in discerning what tax is owed when the business or its assets are acquired. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-61 (requiring the successor to set aside an amount in trust for payment of tax) and § 7-1-62 (1997) (allowing the successor to apply for a certificate from the Department).

Determination of a successor.

A successor in business is "any transferee of a business or property of a business, except to the extent it would be materially inconsistent with the rights of secured creditors". 3.1.10.16 (F) (2) NMAC (2001). There are also several nonexclusive factors to be used in determining a successor in business. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) NMAC. The first factor is whether there was a transfer of property. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (1) NMAC. The second factor is whether the transfer was not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (2) NMAC. The third factor is whether "a substantial part of both equipment and inventories" was transferred. 3.1.10.16 (A) (3) NMAC. The fourth factor is whether a substantial portion of the business conducted by the transferor continued to be conducted by the transferee. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (4) NMAC. The fifth factor is whether "the transferor's goodwill follow[ed] the transfer of the business properties". 3.1.10.16 (A) (5) NMAC. The sixth factor is whether the sales, service, or lease contracts of the

transferor were honored by the transferee. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (6) NMAC. The seventh factor is whether unpaid debts of the transferor were paid by the transferee. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (7) NMAC. The final factor is whether there was an agreement precluding competition. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (8) NMAC. If a single one of these factors are present, there is a presumption that there is a successor in business. *See* 3.1.10.16 (B) NMAC.

The Taxpayer is a successor.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

The first factor in determining whether there is a successor in business is whether there was "a sale and purchase of a major part of the materials, supplies, equipment, merchandise or other inventory of a business enterprise...between a transferor and a transferee in a single or limited number of transactions". 3.1.10.16 (A) (1) NMAC. The Taxpayer acquired the heavy equipment from the Dumptruck business. [Exhibit 1]. The Taxpayer argues that this was not a sale or a purchase, and that two pieces are not a major part of the Dumptruck business's equipment. A sale is "the transfer of property for a price; the agreement by which such a transfer takes place." Black's Law Dictionary, page 559 (pocket ed. 1996). A transfer is "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with the property of a business". 3.1.10.16 (F) (3) NMAC. The equipment was transferred to the Taxpayer for the consideration of taking over the remaining debt on the equipment. The evidence showed that the Dumptruck business has other equipment, in the form of trailers and trucks, but there was no evidence that the Dumptruck business had other heavy equipment. [Exhibit 13]. Therefore, a major part of the Dumptruck business's heavy equipment was transferred to the Taxpayer. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is a successor in business.

M&J Oilfield Services, LLC Case #20.04-052A

page 10 of 19

The second factor is whether the transfer was not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business. See 3.1.10.16 (A) (2) NMAC. The Dumptruck business was not in the business of transferring heavy equipment, so the transfer was not done in the ordinary course of business. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is a successor in business.

The third factor is whether "a substantial part of both equipment and inventories" was transferred. 3.1.10.16 (A) (3) NMAC. The Dumptruck business did not have an inventory, and only two pieces of heavy equipment were transferred, while several trucks and trailers were also owned. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is not a successor in business.

The fourth factor is whether a substantial portion of the business conducted by the transferor continued to be conducted by the transferee. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (4) NMAC. The Dumptruck business was mainly constructing large pads for rigs, tank batteries, and maintenance on the tank battery lines. The Taxpayer's business is mainly sandblasting, painting, and constructing dirt berms around the tanks. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is not a successor in business.

The fifth factor is whether "the transferor's goodwill follow[ed] the transfer of the business properties". 3.1.10.16 (A) (5) NMAC. The Taxpayer acknowledges that the Dumptruck business and the Taxpayer have similar business names. The Taxpayer argues that this is inconsequential since many businesses in New Mexico use M&J in their names. [Exhibit 14]. The Taxpayer also argues that the Dumptruck business was run into the ground and, therefore, had no goodwill to transfer. Goodwill is the "business's reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets". *Black's Law Dictionary*, page 279 (pocket ed. 1996). A business's reputation might be good or bad. This factor relates to whether that reputation follows the transfer of the business's property. The Taxpayer admitted that the only customer that it shared

with the Dumptruck business had concerns that the two were affiliated and would only do business with the Taxpayer after performing its own audit to ensure that they were not. This is evidence that the Dumptruck business's reputation was attached to the Taxpayer. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is a successor in business.

The sixth factor is whether the business obligations of the transferor were honored by the transferee. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (6) NMAC. There was no evidence that the Taxpayer honored any contracts for service that the Dumptruck business had. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is not a successor in business.

The seventh factor is whether "unpaid indebtedness to suppliers, utility companies, service contractors, landlords or employees of the transferor [were] paid by the transferee". *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (7) NMAC. The Taxpayer argues that this factor should not weigh against it because the heavy equipment dealer was not a supplier, utility company, service contractor, landlord, or employee. The critical consideration is not the type of entity to whom the transferor was indebted; rather, it is whether the transferee took on some debt related to the transferor's business. The Taxpayer assumed the debt on the heavy equipment from the Dumptruck business. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is a successor in business.

The final factor is whether there was an agreement precluding competition. *See* 3.1.10.16 (A) (8) NMAC. There was no evidence of such an agreement between the Taxpayer and the Dumptruck business. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is not a successor in business.

The Taxpayer argues that it rebutted the presumption that it was a successor in business because it established that there was no intent to transfer the business and it only purchased the heavy equipment at the suggestion of the equipment dealer. Meeting only one factor creates a

presumption that there is a successor in business, and four of the eight factors weigh in favor of finding that the Taxpayer is successor in business. *See* 3.1.10.16 NMAC. Moreover, all property used in a business "remains subject to liability for payment of the tax". NMSA 1978, § 7-1-61 (B). *See also Sterling Title Co. of Taos v. Comm'r of Revenue*, 1973-NMCA-086, ¶ 23-25, 85 N.M. 279 (noting in the concurrence that the primary purpose of the statute is to make the property of a business serve as security for the payment of tax). Also, "any transferee of...property of a business" is a successor in business. 3.1.10.16 (F) (2) NMAC. Purchasing tangible assets, assuming a lease, keeping one part-time employee, and assuming a note are sufficient to establish one as a successor in business, even when the prior business was defunct. *See Sterling Title*, 1973-NMCA-086, ¶ 9-11. *See also Hi-Country Buick GMC, Inc.*, 2016-NMCA-027. The Taxpayer acquired the heavy equipment from the Dumptruck business and assumed its debt on the heavy equipment. Therefore, the Taxpayer is a successor in business to the Dumptruck business.

Extent of liability.

"A successor may discharge an assessment made pursuant to this section by paying to the department the full value of the transferred tangible and intangible property." NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63 (C). The successor may be liable for the full amount of the assessment if the transfer was done to avoid tax, if the transfer amounted "to a de facto merger, consolidation, or mere continuation of the transferor's business", or if the successor agreed to assume the liability. *Id.* The statute essentially codifies the exceptions that the court recognized. *See Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank*, 1941-NMSC-060, ¶ 13, 46 N.M. 10 (holding that a successor may be liable for its predecessor's debts if they agreed to assume the debt, were a merger or consolidation, were a mere continuation, or if the transaction was a fraudulent attempt to avoid the liability).

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

1920

21

The Taxpayer did not agree to assume the Dumptruck business's tax liability. The Department argues both that the transfer was done to avoid the tax and that the Taxpayer's business is merely a continuation of the Dumptruck business.

The Department argues that the similarity of services provided, the similarity of name, the shared employees and subcontractors, and the similarity of gross receipts establish that the Taxpayer is a "mere continuation" of the Dumptruck business. See 3.1.10.16 (F) (1) (defining mere continuation using a substantial continuity test from B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 1996)⁴). However, our courts have determined that the key element of "mere continuation" is that the successor and the predecessor businesses share the same directors, officers, or shareholders. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 1997-NMSC-013, ¶ 13, 123 N.M. 34. See also Pankey, 1941-NMSC-060, ¶ 13. There is not a "mere continuation...without proof of continuity of management and ownership". Garcia, 1997-NMSC-013, ¶ 13 (citing Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W. 2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)). When the predecessor and the successor did not share directors, officers, or shareholders, the mere continuation exception did not apply. See *Garcia*, 1997-NMSC-013, ¶ 13. *See also In the Matter of the Protest of Corrosion Services* Corporation, Decision and Order No. 07-16 (Admin. Hearings Office). The Father was the owner and manager of the Dumptruck business, and the Owner worked there as a laborer and salesman. The Owner is the manager of the Taxpayer, and the Father works there as a mechanic. Ms. Bradshaw worked at the Dumptruck business as a secretary, and now she serves as the office manager for the Taxpayer. Other shared employees do not have any managerial duties or ownership of either business. There is not sufficient evidence that there is a continuity of

⁴ The case cited in the regulation has been reversed. *See New York v. National Services Industries, Inc.*, 352 F.3d 682 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that *Betkoski* is no longer good law because it deviated from the common rules of successor liability).

7

9

10 11

12

13

14 15

16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23

management and ownership between the Taxpayer and the Dumptruck business. Therefore, the Taxpayer is not a mere continuation of the Dumptruck business.

The Department argues that the businesses are owned by members of a close-knit family. The Department argues that the creation of the Taxpayer occurred a short time after the Dumptruck business's tax assessment. The Department argues that the Dumptruck business officially closed shortly after the Taxpayer was created and that many of the Dumptruck business's employees went to work for the Taxpayer. Based on the evidence, the timing of these events is not surprising. Most of the witnesses testified that the Dumptruck business's problems kept getting worse, that its customers and vendors began to complain regularly, and that it ultimately failed in 2016. The Owner explained that he fielded some of those complaints, felt that the Dumptruck business was going to fail, and he decided to start his own business so that he would still have a job. The Owner was familiar with many of the employees and knew that they needed work after the Dumptruck business failed. Some of the employees only worked for the Taxpayer for a very short time because it became apparent to the Owner that they were not suited to the types of services that the Taxpayer was supplying.

The Department argues that the Father and the Rentals business made transfers of vehicles to the Owner shortly after the Taxpayer was created, and those transfers were for nominal amounts rather than fair market value. [Exhibit 5, Exhibit B]. The Department argues that the Father had a habit of registering vehicles in his own name even though he used them in his businesses. The Father's business practices are somewhat suspicious. However, there was no evidence that the vehicles transferred by the Father or the Rentals business were owned by, or used by, the Dumptruck business. Apparently, the Dumptruck business had some vehicles registered to it since the Department filed liens on those vehicles.

The Department argues that both businesses are providing strong laborers and construction-type services to oilfield companies. The Department argues that using M&J in the business names is a family tradition. The Department argues that the totality should lead to the conclusion that the family had come together to subvert the Dumptruck business's tax liability. The Father and the Mother explained how they completely neglected the Dumptruck business after their daughter was diagnosed with cancer in November 2014. Their continued emotional distress was apparent during their testimony. The Owner and Ms. Bradshaw also confirmed that the Father and the Mother were focused solely on their daughter and her healthcare around the time that the Dumptruck business collapsed and that the Taxpayer was created. According to the witnesses, during that time, the Father and the Mother were frequently away from home and did not give their other children much of their time or attention. Given the extreme personal and emotional upheaval that they were experiencing at the time, as well as the parents' concentration on their daughter's welfare and neglect of their business, it is unlikely that the family conspired together to evade the Dumptruck business's tax liability.

As the transfer was not done to avoid the tax, the Taxpayer's business is not a mere continuation, and the Taxpayer did not agree to assume the tax liability, the Taxpayer's liability is limited to the full value of the heavy equipment that was transferred. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63 (C). The only evidence presented on the value of the heavy equipment was contained in Exhibit 1. The Taxpayer argues that full value of the heavy equipment is reflected in the insurance valuation, at \$54,583.08, the amount that excludes the tax. [Exhibit 1.14]. "Full value" is not defined in the statute. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63. However, value is the worth or price of an item, and fair market value is the price that an item can garner in an open market in an arm's-length transaction. *See Black's Law Dictionary*, pages 1690-1691 (9th ed. 2009). The

Taxpayer agreed to pay a total of \$60,603.30 for the heavy equipment. [Exhibit 1.12]. Therefore, the value of the heavy equipment is at least \$60,603.30.

Administrative costs and fees.

This issue was not argued at the hearing. However, the Taxpayer raised this issue in its protest, and the prehearing statement requests a remedy for the Department's alleged violation of the New Mexico Taxpayer Bill of Rights. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-4.2 (2017). The request for a remedy was also argued at the hearing. The Taxpayer argues that the Department did not provide the Taxpayer "with an explanation of the results of and basis for" the assessment. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-4.2 (F). The Taxpayer argues that it made repeated requests for an explanation and that the Department's repeated response that it determined that the Taxpayer was a successor in business based on the criteria of the regulation, without being more specific, was inadequate and violated the statute. The Taxpayer argues that the Department's response was merely a reiteration of its conclusion and was not an explanation. [*See* Exhibit 11].

A taxpayer is entitled to recover reasonable costs and fees if the taxpayer is the prevailing party in the protest. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-29.1 (2019). The statute does not provide for an award of costs and fees for any other reason. *See id.* The statute provides that "the taxpayer is the prevailing party if the taxpayer has: (a) substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy; or (b) substantially prevailed with respect to most of the issues involved in the case or the most significant issue or set of issues involved in the case". NMSA 1978, § 7-1-29.1 (C) (1). The Taxpayer substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy since the assessment was for a total of \$3,699,139.19, but the Taxpayer's liability can be satisfied by paying the full value of the transferred heavy equipment, which is \$60,603.30. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63. However, a taxpayer "is not the prevailing party if the administrative hearings office

1 finds to 2 applic 3 the pro 4 heavy 5 evider 6 various 7 to rebin 8 made

finds that the position of the department in the proceeding was based upon a reasonable application of the law to the facts of the case." NMSA 1978, § 7-1-29.1 (C) (2). As detailed in the previous section, in addition to the Taxpayer's assumption of the debt and acquisition of the heavy equipment, the Department drew a number of inferences based on the circumstantial evidence surrounding the relationships of the owners of the businesses, the timing of their various transactions, and the business practices used. Although the Taxpayer was ultimately able to rebut many of those inferences, the Department's position was reasonable at the time that it made the assessment. *See id.* Therefore, the Taxpayer is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to an award of costs and fees. *See id.*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- A. Taxpayer filed a timely, written protest of the Department's assessment and jurisdiction lies over the parties and the subject matter of this protest.
- B. The first hearing was timely set and held within 90 days of request for hearing. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1B-8 (2019). *See* 22.600.3.8 (2018).
- C. The Taxpayer is a successor in business to the Dumptruck business. *See* NMSA 1978, §§ 7-1-61 thru 7-1-63. *See* 3.1.10.16 NMAC. *See Sterling Title*, 1973-NMCA-086. *See also Hi-Country Buick GMC, Inc.*, 2016-NMCA-027.
- D. The Taxpayer is not a mere continuation of the Dumptruck business, the transfer of the heavy equipment was not an attempt to evade or defeat the tax, and the Taxpayer did not assume the tax liability of the Dumptruck business; therefore, the Taxpayer may discharge its assessment by paying the full value of the transferred heavy equipment, which is \$60,603.30. *See* NMSA 1978, § 7-1-63.

1 E. The Taxpayer is not the prevailing party because the Department's position was 2 reasonable at the time that it made the assessment. See NMSA 1978, § 7-1-29.1. For the foregoing reasons, the Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED IN PART AND 3 4 **GRANTED IN PART**. **IT IS ORDERED** that Taxpayer is liable for \$60,603.30 as a successor 5 in business and that the remaining amount of the Taxpayer's assessment is HEREBY ABATED. 6 DATED: December 11, 2020. 7 Dee Dee Hoxie Dee Dee Hoxie 8 9 Hearing Officer Administrative Hearings Office 10 P.O. Box 6400 11 12 Santa Fe, NM 87502 **NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL** 13 14 Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this 15 decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within 30 days of the 16 date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this 17 Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates 18 the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. 19 Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative 20 Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative 21 Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a 22 copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, 23 which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing

statement from the appealing party. See Rule 12-209 NMRA.

24

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	On December 11, 2020, a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was submitted to the
3	parties listed below in the following manner:
4	Email Email
5	INTENTIONALLY BLANK
7	John Griego
8	Legal Assistant
9	Administrative Hearings Office
10	P.O. Box 6400
11	Santa Fe, NM 87502