1 2 3	STATE OF NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT
4 5 6 7	IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF P S T SERVICES INC. TO ASSESSMENT ISSUED UNDER LETTER ID NO. L1532005168
8	v. AHO Case Number 18.09-232A, D&O #20-10
9	NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT
10	DECISION AND ORDER
11	On February 3, 2020, Hearing Officer Chris Romero, Esq., conducted a hearing on the
12	merits of the protest of P S T Services, Inc. ("Taxpayer") pursuant to the Tax Administration Act
13	and the Administrative Hearings Office Act. Ms. Dana Allen, C.P.A. appeared as Taxpayer's
14	authorized representative and only witness.
15	Mr. Richard Pener, Esq. appeared on behalf of the opposing party in the protest, the
16	Taxation and Revenue Department ("Department"), accompanied by Ms. Mary Griego, protest
17	auditor, who also appeared as a witness for the Department. Ms. Lisa Farmelo appeared
18	telephonically pursuant to an administrative subpoena and testified at the request of the
19	Department.
20	Taxpayer Exhibit Nos. 1 – 10 and Department Exhibits J, M, and Q were admitted into the
21	evidentiary record without objection.
22	Taxpayer presents the following issues which it asserts should reduce or eliminate its
23	purported liability under the assessment: (1) whether Taxpayer is entitled to relief solely by virtue of
24	the Department's untimely request for hearing which exceeded the timelines provided under NMSA
25	1978, Section 7-1B-8 (A) (2015, amended 2019); (2) whether receipts generated from affording
26	access to software are properly characterized as licensing and therefore come within the definition

1	of "gross receipts" as defined by the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, NMSA 1978,
2	Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (2007, amended 2019), and if so, whether those licenses where sold or
3	employed in New Mexico; (3) whether Taxpayer's receipts should be excludable or exempt as
4	services performed outside of New Mexico, also under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (2007,
5	amended 2019), and NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 (1989); and (4) whether Taxpayer is entitled to
6	an abatement of penalty under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-69 (2007) or Regulation 3.1.11.11 NMAC.
7	As expounded in greater detail below, the Hearing Officer determined that Taxpayer is not
8	entitled to relief from the assessment by virtue of the Department's untimely hearing request and
9	that it did not rebut the presumption of correctness that attached to the assessment by establishing
10	that its receipts should be excluded from taxation or that it is entitled to a deduction or exemption on
11	those receipts. Finally, the Hearing Officer concluded that there was a lack of evidence to find that
12	Taxpayer was entitled to abatement of penalty. Therefore, Taxpayer's protest should be denied. IT
13	IS DECIDED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
14	FINDINGS OF FACT
15	<u>Witnesses</u>
16	1. Ms. Dana Allen is a certified public accountant and vice president of indirect tax
17	at McKesson Corporation. She has been employed at McKesson Corporation since 2009. [Direct
18	Examination of Ms. Allen; Cross Examination of Ms. Allen]
19	2. At all relevant times, McKesson Corporation was Taxpayer's parent corporation.
20	Although McKesson Corporation has since sold Taxpayer, McKesson Corporation and Ms.
21	Allen remain authorized to represent Taxpayer in this protest. [Direct Examination of Ms. Allen;
22	Taxpayer Exs. 8 – 10]
23	3. Ms. Allen, although employed by Taxpayer's parent corporation, was never

employed by Taxpayer. [Cross Examination of Ms. Allen]

- 4. To the extent Ms. Allen, in the scope of her employment at McKesson

 Corporation would have worked on any matters relevant to Taxpayer's business operations, it

 would have concentrated on taxation issues. She was not engaged in Taxpayer's daily operations.

 [Cross Examination of Ms. Allen]
- 5. Ms. Allen's personal knowledge of facts relevant to the protest was acquired through research she conducted either unrelated to or subsequent to the audit, assessment and protest. Her research consisted of discussions with Taxpayer's employees, reference to internal materials, and public sources including the internet. [Cross Examination of Ms. Allen]
- 6. Ms. Allen's knowledge of Taxpayer's business activities germane to the protest developed primarily from her research. Ms. Allen has no personal knowledge of Taxpayer's business operations. [Cross Examination of Ms. Allen]
- 7. Ms. Lisa J. Farmelo resides in Tijeras, New Mexico. She has a background in medical billing and had been employed by Taxpayer since 2008. At all relevant times she was a client manager responsible for monitoring and evaluating the back-end revenue cycle process which included monitoring and evaluating key performance indicators, which she called "KPI," which consisted of charges, cash, payor edits, denial rate, gross collection rates, and aging accounts, all of which enable her to assist in devising strategies for enhancing a client's procedures for collecting revenue. [Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo]
- 8. Although Ms. Farmelo is generally familiar with the services Taxpayer provided, her expertise was admittedly concentrated on her individual responsibilities and services she personally performed. [Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo]
 - 9. Ms. Mary Griego is a protest auditor with the Department. [Direct Examination of

1	v. "aging payment report[.]"
2	vi. "general accounts receivable summary[.]"
3	vii. "physician documentation feedback (if applicable)[.]"
4	viii. "incoming patient calls (number, average time, number dropped)[.]"
5 6 7	ix. "Ad-hoc reports, containing information applicable to Affiliate's practice only (such ad-hoc reports may be subject to an additional fee)[.]"
8 9	[Second Re-Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo; Taxpayer Ex. 4.8 (Para. (t))]
10 11 12 13	c. "Provide current knowledge of governmental regulations, third-party payer activities, competition, economic changes and other outside influences affecting Affiliate(s)." [Second Re-Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo; Taxpayer Ex. 4.8 (Para. (u))]
14 15	d. "Provide annual charge review and analysis/projections;" [Second Re-Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo." Taxpayer Ex. 4.8 (Para. (w))]
16 17 18	e. "Provide annual impact analysis of Medicare reductions and/or participation evaluation and recommendation." [Second Re-Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo; Taxpayer Ex. 4.8 (Para. (x))]
19 20 21 22	f. "Perform quarterly clinic documentation reviews and provide Client with results within thirty (30) days thereafter and work with the Operations Steering Committee to address issues raised." [Second Re-Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo; Taxpayer Ex. 4.9 (Para. (ss))]
23	33. Ms. Farmelo compiled data and assembled it in a presentation that she would then
24	personally present on a monthly basis to ABQ Health's management personnel. [Cross
25	Examination of Ms. Farmelo]
26	34. Based on Ms. Farmelo's evaluations and input, ABQ Health's management could
27	make corrections or implement adjustments to its procedures with the goal of enhancing its cash
28	flow. Ms. Farmelo would typically work with ABQ Health's director of revenue cycle or chief
29	financial officer. [Direct Examination of Ms. Farmelo]
30	35. Improvements to ABQ Health's cash flow, stemming from Ms. Farmelo's work,

Timeliness of Department's Hearing Request

The parties did not dispute the fact that the Department's request for a hearing in this protest was untimely. The statute in effect at the time required that the Department, within 45 days from receipt of the protest, request a hearing from the Administrative Hearings Office, which was then to conduct a hearing within 90 days from the date of Taxpayer's protest. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (A) (2015, amended 2019). However, a review of the administrative file illustrates that the Department filed its Hearing Request with the Administrative Hearings Office on September 20, 2018, representing 161 days from the date it initially acknowledged Taxpayer's protest of the assessment on April 12, 2018.

Based on the foregoing, Taxpayer asserted that the assessment should essentially be nullified and its protest granted because of the Department's untimeliness in requesting a hearing. Taxpayer, however, cites no authority for the proposition that its protest may be granted on technical grounds not associated with the merits of the protest, essentially averting the effects of both the presumption of taxability under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-5 and the presumption of correctness under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007).

At the time the protest was initiated, there was no statutory authority for the Hearing Officer to dismiss a protest for failure to make a timely hearing request. *See id.* The statute has since been amended, but the amendment still provides no authority to award the sort of relief Taxpayer seeks as a remedy for the Department's untimeliness under the circumstances of this protest. Under the present law, the Department's failure to comply with the statutory deadlines could warrant an order halting the ongoing accrual of interest on a protested liability. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (E) (2019).

However, Taxpayer does not explicitly seek relief under the 2019 version of Section 7-1B-8 (E) (2019). Even if it did, the amendment did not become effective until June 14, 2019, well after the assessment and resulting protest, and any argument that the statute should be applied retrospectively would need to overcome the presumption that "[a] statute or rule operates prospectively only unless the statute or rule expressly provides otherwise or its context requires that it operate retrospectively." *See* NMSA 1978, Section 12-2A-8 (1997). The 2019 amendment provides no such expression of intent, nor can retrospectivity be fluently derived from its context. *See* 2019 N.M. Laws 157.

Reference to the 2019 statute is nevertheless helpful because had the Legislature intended that dismissal of an assessment be a remedy for the Department's failure to adhere to a deadline, then it could have specified as such in the law, but it did not. Instead, the only remedy it expressly allowed was to halt further accrual of interest on the protested liability.

Taxpayer's position on this issue is not novel. Other taxpayers have previously asserted the Department's purported denial of the statutory right to a prompt hearing should afford relief from the assessment. *See Ranchers-Tufco Limestone Project Joint Venture v. Revenue Div.*, 1983-NMCA-126, ¶ 12, 100 N.M. 632. However, the Court of Appeals has concluded that the

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tardiness of public officers in performing their duties is not a defense to an action by the state.

See id. That has represented the general rule of New Mexico for almost four decades and "is

In another example, a taxpayer argued that the failure of a hearing officer to render a

decision in 30 days, as required by statute, divested the hearing officer of jurisdiction. See

applicable in these cases unless [the statute] makes it inapplicable." *Id.*

Kmart Properties, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't., 2006-NMCA-026, ¶ 53, 139 N.M. 177.

The court found that the tax statutory deadline was not jurisdictional because of the general

tardiness rule and the heavy statutory presumption of correctness that favors the Department.

See id. at ¶ 54.

Although the Department's failure to file a request for hearing within the prescribed timeframe contradicted the statute, the relief sought by Taxpayer is not available under the law. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (2015) and (2019). Taxpayer's request that the assessment be dismissed and its protest granted on the basis of an untimely hearing request is denied.

Merits of the Protest and the Presumption of Correctness

Under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007), the assessment issued in this case is presumed correct. Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of the Tax Administration Act, "tax" includes interest and civil penalty. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-3 (X) (2013). Therefore, under Regulation 3.1.6.13 NMAC, the presumption of correctness under Section 7-1-17 (C) also extends to the Department's assessment of penalty and interest. *See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue*, 2006-NMCA-050, ¶16, 139 N.M. 498, 134 P.3d 785 (agency regulations interpreting a statute are presumed proper and are to be given substantial weight).

For that reason, the presumption in favor of the Department requires that Taxpayer carry the burden to present countervailing evidence or legal argument to show that it is entitled to an

1	abatement of an assessment. See N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Casias Trucking, 2014-
2	NMCA-099, ¶8, 336 P.3d 436. "Unsubstantiated statements that the assessment is incorrect
3	cannot overcome the presumption of correctness." See MPC Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue
4	Dep't, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13, 133 N.M. 217, 62 P.3d 308; See also Regulation 3.1.6.12 NMAC.
5	If a taxpayer presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, then the burden shifts to the
6	Department to re-establish the correctness of the assessment. See MPC, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13.
7	In circumstances where a taxpayer's claim for relief relies on the application of an
8	exemption or deduction, then "the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing
9	authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed
10	in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." See Wing Pawn Shop v.
11	Taxation and Revenue Department, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649
12	(internal citation omitted); See also TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2003-NMSC-
13	007, ¶9, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474.
14	Gross Receipts Tax
15	The assessment in this protest arises from the application of the Gross Receipts and
16	Compensating Tax Act, in which New Mexico imposes a gross receipts tax for the privilege of
17	engaging in business, on the receipts of any person engaged in business in New Mexico. See
18	NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-4 (2002).
19	The term "gross receipts" is broadly defined at NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (1) (2007,
20	amended 2019), to mean:
21 22 23 24 25 26	the total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico, from leasing or licensing property employed in New Mexico, from granting a right to use a franchise employed in New Mexico, from selling services performed outside New Mexico, the product of which is initially used in New Mexico, or from performing services in New Mexico.

"Engaging in business" is defined as "carrying on or causing to be carried on any activity with the purpose of direct or indirect benefit." *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.3 (2003). There is a statutory presumption that all receipts of a person engaged in such business are taxable. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-5 (2002).

Discussion of Taxpayer's Evidence

Taxpayer's position in this protest ultimately fails due to insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness of the assessment. Although the Hearing Officer found Ms. Allen to be pleasant and credible, she candidly acknowledged a lack of personal knowledge underlying substantive aspects pertinent to Taxpayer's operations. Her expertise in the area was clearly in taxation, but thorough evaluation of the merits of Taxpayer's position required a more thorough presentation of evidence in support of the material facts.

Flowcast

Ms. Allen asserted that Taxpayer's services for ABQ Health relied on the use of Flowcast. Taxpayer acquired 525 Flowcast licenses from IDX, or General Electric, and subsequently permitted their use by ABQ Health in exchange for compensation from ABQ Health. Although ABQ Health may not have used all 525 licenses, it still incurred the obligation to pay Taxpayer for them.

Taxpayer does not apparently view this arrangement as the licensing of software. Instead, according to Ms. Allen, "[Taxpayer] recovers the cost of the Flowcast software from [ABQ Health]" suggesting that compensation for use of Flowcast represents something other than the sale of a license to use the software. [Direct Examination of Ms. Allen, 00:29:40 – 00:30:35].

It takes the same stance in response to interrogatories propounded by the Department, stating that the "[Flowcast] software program was not sold nor licensed to [ABQ Health].

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[Taxpayer] licenses Flowcast software from GE and provides to [ABQ Health] some of the [Taxpayer] licenses for use by [ABQ Health] employees." See Taxpayer Ex. 7.1 (Item 7.1). Stated differently elsewhere in the same exhibit, Taxpayer states, "[ABQ Health] did not have a license to use the Flowcast software." See Taxpayer Ex. 7.2 (Item 8).

In evaluating Taxpayer's position, the first inquiry may be to merely identify what rights ABQ Health acquired from Taxpayer to use Flowcast if indeed, it did not acquire licenses. "Particularly with regard to computer software, [Courts] have recognized that copyright owners may create licensing arrangements so that users acquire only a license to use the particular copy of software and do not acquire title that permits further transfer or sale of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner." See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, "running copyrighted software, without ownership of the copyright or a license to run the software, constitutes copyright infringement." See Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, 457 F. Supp. 2d 969, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

Therefore, the rule as summarized in *UMG Recordings* and *Iconix* suggests that ABQ Health could lawfully run Flowcast only under one of two possible situations: (1) ABQ Health owned Flowcast (which it clearly does not under the evidence presented); or (2) ABQ Health was a licensed user. The third scenario urged by Taxpayer, in which ABQ Health comes within neither situation, hints at the possibility of an unauthorized use that the Hearing Officer presumes Taxpayer did not intend.

Since the Hearing Officer will not infer based on the evidence presented that ABQ Health's use of Flowcast was unauthorized, the only other means of affording ABQ Health the authorized use of Flowcast would be through licensing. Regrettably, the record is devoid of any licensing agreements among IDX or General Electric, Taxpayer, and ABQ Health, that established the terms

and conditions for ABQ Health to use Flowcast. The Audit Narrative indicates that this was an area of further inquiry, but Taxpayer did not apparently provide the information the Department requested. *See* Taxpayer Ex. 2.8 (Records Requested Not Provided).

Yet it would be entirely unreasonable to infer that ABQ Health paid Taxpayer the sum of \$7,860,277.00 for what could amount to an unauthorized use of Flowcast. In contrast, this is consistent with licensing despite Taxpayer's assertions to the contrary. It was therefore reasonable for the Department to characterize Taxpayer's receipts for "Flowcast System" as deriving from selling licenses to use software.

The Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act provides two methods through which Taxpayer could be liable for gross receipts tax for the sale of Flowcast licenses. The first scenario is when the sale occurs in the State of New Mexico because "gross receipts" includes the "total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico[.]" The second scenario arises from "licensing property employed in New Mexico." *See* Section 7-9-3.5 (A). In either scenario, the term "license" comes within the definition of "property" under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3 (J) (2007).

In these contexts, the Department has promulgated Regulation 3.2.1.27 (B) NMAC which provides, "[t]he definition of property includes licenses. The sale of a license to use software constitutes a sale of property and comes within the definition of gross receipts." *See* Regulation 3.2.1.27 (B) (1) NMAC.

Therefore, unless Taxpayer acquired title to Flowcast, which the evidence does not establish, then the only thing Taxpayer could lawfully convey to ABQ Health was some type of license authorizing its use, and when that conveyance is accomplished in exchange for consideration, that is selling of a license, or the licensing of property, as contemplated by Section 7-

9-3.5 (A) (2007, amended 2019) and Regulation 3.2.1.27 (B) NMAC. The Hearing Officer is unable to conclude based on the evidence presented that the auditor erred in deciding the receipts from "Flowcast System" derived from the sale of a license to use software.

Ms. Allen argued that even if Taxpayer were engaged in the sale of software licenses for use of Flowcast, ABQ Health only employed approximately 69 percent of the licenses in New Mexico, clearly relying on the portion of Section 7-9-3.5 (A) which establishes that "gross receipts" includes "licensing property *employed* in New Mexico[.]" (Emphasis Added). Therefore, Ms. Allen asserts that taxable receipts, if any, should be proportionately adjusted. In other words, the entire sum of receipts deriving from the "Flowcast System" should be proportionately reduced to reflect the percentage of licenses actually employed in New Mexico.

However, Ms. Allen's argument falters due to a lack of evidence to establish the facts upon which it relies because there is simply no reliable or trustworthy evidence to substantiate her statements that only 365 of the entire lot of 525 licenses were employed inside New Mexico. As stated previously, unsubstantiated statements cannot overcome the presumption of correctness. *See MPC Ltd.*, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13. Having searched the evidentiary record, the Hearing Officer is unable to corroborate and otherwise substantiate Taxpayer's verbal assertions that ABQ Health did not employ all 525 licenses in New Mexico. For that reason, the Hearing Officer is unable to conclude based on the evidence presented that this argument, in any way, should disturb the presumption of correctness.

Location of Performance of Services

Taxpayer asserted error with the Department's conclusion, at the time of the audit, that a portion of receipts not derived from providing access to the "Flowcast System" should also be taxable as software licensing. Taxpayer underscores that these receipts were not in consideration for

affording access to Flowcast but were generated from providing services which it claims were performed outside of New Mexico.

The Hearing Officer agrees with Taxpayer that receipts not specifically generated from providing access to Flowcast were actually derived through the performance of services. Although Taxpayer did not raise such argument, the Hearing Officer nevertheless considered upon is own initiative whether that fact alone was sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the assessment.

The Hearing Officer concluded that the assessment was still correct, even if for the wrong reason. Services performed in New Mexico are taxable pursuant to the same statute as the sale of property or the licensing of property employed in New Mexico. *See* Section 7-9-3.5 (A). Moreover, all receipts of a person engaging in business in New Mexico are presumed taxable. *See* Section 7-9-5. Mis-categorizing receipts deriving from one source of income does not defeat the general rule of taxability if the receipts should have been classified as taxable under another source of income, and in this case, mis-categorization of receipts did not alter the amounts purportedly due under the assessment.

Nevertheless, Taxpayer aptly argued from the onset of the hearing that its receipts from providing services should not be taxable because the services it provided were performed outside of New Mexico. Taxpayer relied on Section 7-9-3.5 (A) as well as Section 7-9-13.1 (A) which exempts from the gross receipts tax "receipts from selling services performed outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico."

Once again, Taxpayer's position relies entirely on Ms. Allen's testimony which presents a significant evidentiary concern because, as previously stated, Ms. Allen admittedly lacks personal knowledge underlying substantive aspects of Taxpayer's operations and presented no other

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evidence to substantiate her testimony, which is required to rebut the presumption of correctness. See MPC Ltd., 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13

In contrast, the Department presented the testimony of Ms. Lisa Farmelo who during all relevant times was employed by Taxpayer and worked and resided in New Mexico and who, in her own words, served as the "bridge" between ABQ Health and Taxpayer. One of her functions, which she described, was to build relationships with ABQ Health. These functions extended beyond the specific services she performed and even included participating in social functions like potlucks and baby showers.

Yet, the evidence established that Ms. Farmelo was far more than Taxpayer's goodwill ambassador. She performed vital functions essential to the overall provision of Taxpayer's services and did so in New Mexico. She met on a monthly basis with ABQ Health to evaluate its key performance indicators, or "KPI," which it would then rely upon in making adjustments that were intended to enhance its cash flow and profitability. She produced and provided: fee schedule consultation, evaluation and development services; monthly data and management reports; reports identifying monthly/yearly financial comparative trends by payclass and procedure; referring physician reports by physician, procedure and dollar volume; charge and payment analysis total and by payclass; location productivity profile and summary; aging payment report; general accounts receivable summary; physician documentation feedback; evaluation of incoming patient call data such as number of calls, average call time, and number of calls dropped; ad-hoc reports containing information applicable to client's practice. She consulted on governmental regulations, third-party payer activities, competition, economic changes and other factors potentially affecting ABQ Health. She provided annual charge review and analysis/projections. She provided annual impact analysis of Medicare reductions and participation evaluation and recommendations. She prepared quarterly

clinic documentation reviews, provided ABQ Health with her conclusions, and worked with it to address issues.

Ms. Farmelo was also not the only person in New Mexico performing services on behalf of Taxpayer for ABQ Health. Ms. Farmelo testified that Ms. Jiao Ding and Mr. Roger Carl were also instrumental in work performed for ABQ Health. Mr. Carl was a client relationship manager who supervised Ms. Farmelo. He also shared in Taxpayer's efforts to maintain a local, day-to-day relationship with ABQ Health, which meant being available to answer questions, conduct regular meetings to establish goals, targets, and client business strategies, or being available to resolve client issues. *See* Taxpayer Ex. 7.1. Ms. Ding, a local client service representative, was instrumental in gathering data, and providing local assistance with revenue cycle operations and account management. *See id*.

Although the Department did not dispute the contention that some services could have been performed outside of New Mexico, it emphasized during its cross examination of Ms. Allen that Taxpayer lacked evidence which might allocate a percentage of services among New Mexico and other jurisdictions. Situations such as this are not unusual. The Department promulgated Regulation 3.2.1.18 (B) NMAC which establishes the general rule that "[r]eceipts from services, other than research and development services and services subject to the Interstate Telecommunications Gross Receipts Tax Act, performed both within and without New Mexico are subject to the gross receipts tax on the portion of the services performed within New Mexico." (Emphasis Added).

The regulation goes on to provide methods through which taxpayer can compute the amount of tax due for the portion of receipts generated from services performed in New Mexico. Regulation 3.2.1.18 (C) NMAC provides that "[a]llocating receipts from selling services performed within and without New Mexico" may be accomplished in several ways. The most pertinent method under the

Penalty

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in order to extract the percentage of New Mexico's contribution in relation to all others.

When a taxpayer fails to pay taxes due to the State because of negligence or disregard of rules and regulations, but without intent to evade or defeat a tax, NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-69 (2007) requires that:

there *shall* be added to the amount assessed a penalty in an amount equal to the greater of: (1) two percent per month or any fraction of a month from the date the tax was due multiplied by the amount of tax due but not paid, not to exceed twenty percent of the tax due but not paid.

(Emphasis Added)

The statute's use of the word "shall" makes the imposition of penalty mandatory in all instances where a taxpayer's actions or inactions meet the legal definition of "negligence." *See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶22, 146 N.M. 24, 32 (use of the word "shall" in a statute indicates that a provision is mandatory absent clear indication to the contrary).

Regulation 3.1.11.10 NMAC defines negligence in three ways: (A) "failure to exercise that degree of ordinary business care and prudence which reasonable taxpayers would exercise under like circumstances;" (B) "inaction by taxpayer where action is required"; or (C) "inadvertence, indifference, thoughtlessness, carelessness, erroneous belief or inattention." In this case, Taxpayer was negligent because it failed to accurately compute, report and pay its gross receipts tax obligations under A, B, and C.

On occasions where a taxpayer might fall under the definition of civil negligence generally subject to penalty, Section 7-1-69 (B) provides a limited exception in that "[n]o penalty shall be assessed against a taxpayer if the failure to pay an amount of tax when due results from a mistake of law made in good faith and on reasonable grounds."

Ms. Allen requested that penalty be abated but did not specify on what grounds she sought such relief. Upon inquiry of the Hearing Officer, Ms. Allen explained her presumption

that Taxpayer would have sought out tax advice but the Hearing Officer perceived her response as speculative, at best. Even if there were some degree of certainty that Taxpayer sought out advice, there is nothing in the record to establish what the advice entailed or the facts on which it relied, nor is there any evidence to establish the qualifications, and therefore the competency, of the person rendering the advice. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the mistake of law provision of Section 7-1-69 (B) should provide for an abatement of penalty in this case. *See C & D Trailer Sales v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1979-NMCA-151, ¶¶8-9, 93 N.M. 697, 604 P.2d 835 (penalty upheld where there was no evidence that the taxpayer "relied on any informed consultation" in deciding not to pay tax).

Further grounds for abatement of civil negligence penalty are provided by Regulation 3.1.11.11 NMAC. That regulation establishes eight indicators of non-negligence where penalty may be abated. Based on the argument of Taxpayer and the evidence presented, there is insufficient evidence on which to apply any one of the factors under Regulation 3.1.11.11 NMAC.

It is Taxpayer's duty to ascertain the tax consequences of its actions. *See Tiffany Constr.*Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 1976-NMCA-127, ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 16, 558 P.2d 1155. Taxpayers cannot "abdicate this responsibility [to learn of tax obligations] merely by appointing an accountant as its agent in tax matters." *See El Centro Villa Nursing Center v. Taxation and Revenue Department*, 1989-NMCA-070, ¶14, 108 N.M. 795.

The Department does not allege that Taxpayer's actions or inactions were intended to evade or defeat a tax. But even if arising from inadvertence or erroneous belief, *El Centro Villa Nursing* provides that civil negligence penalty is appropriate and Regulation 3.1.11.11 (D) NMAC offers no basis for the abatement of penalty.

Taxpayer did not rebut the statutory presumption of correctness that attached to the

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1 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 2 Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this 3 decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within 30 days of the 4 date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this 5 Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates 6 the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. 7 Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative 8 Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative 9 Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a 10 copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, 11 which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing 12 statement from the appealing party. See Rule 12-209 NMRA. **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 13 14 On May 12th, 2020, a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was submitted to the 15 parties listed below in the following manner: 16 First Class Mail Interagency State Mail 17 INTENTIONALLY BLANK 18 19 John Griego 20 Legal Assistant Administrative Hearings Office 21 22 P.O. Box 6400 23 Santa Fe. NM 87502