1 2 3	STATE OF NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT
4 5 6 7	IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF CONTINENTAL LAND RESOURCES TO ASSESSMENT ISSUED UNDER LETTER ID NO. L1440900400
8	v. D&O No. 20-04
9	NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT
10	DECISION AND ORDER
11	On November 4, 2019, Hearing Officer Chris Romero, Esq., conducted a hearing on the
12	merits of the protest of Continental Land Resources ("Taxpayer") pursuant to the Tax
13	Administration Act and the Administrative Hearings Office Act. Mr. R. Tracy Sprouls, Esq.
14	(Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.) appeared on behalf of Taxpayer, accompanied by
15	Mr. Terry Jennings, Mr. Ken Hammond, Mr. Dave Bolton, and Ms. Cathy Couch who all
16	appeared and testified on behalf of Taxpayer.
17	Mr. Marek Grabowski, Esq. appeared on behalf of the opposing party in the protest, the
18	Taxation and Revenue Department ("Department"), accompanied by Ms. Mary Griego, protest
19	auditor, who also appeared as a witness for the Department. Mr. Danny Pogan was also present
20	for the Department but was not called to testify.
21	Taxpayer Exhibit Nos. $1-39$ and Department Exhibits $A-H$ were admitted into the
22	evidentiary record without objection. Taxpayer Exhibits 1 – 17 were received electronically and in
23	hardcopy. Taxpayer Exhibits 18 – 39 consist of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and were received
24	electronically only. All electronic submissions are contained on a thumb drive labeled "Hearing
25	Exhibits 1 – 39."
26	The issues in the protest are: (1) whether receipts derived from various services are
	In the Matter of the Protest of Continental Land Resources Page 1 of 54

than the underlying data which they incorporate. For example, client invoices will not specify the

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Taxpayer established that the Department's audit overstated Taxpayer's gross

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¹ Note d at Taxpayer Ex. 33 computes the overstatement as \$5,065.38 but that appears to be a miscalculation. The difference between the "per Auditor report" and the "per Taxpayer all client" is \$3,944.68 (\$68,441.98 - \$64,497.30).

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exception for administrative costs or fees. However, receipts generated from services performed

in New Mexico, identified by landmen based in New Mexico or traveling to New Mexico should

have been \$197,637.98, meaning that the Department overstated Taxpayer's gross receipts in

2012 by the difference of \$35,786.78 in reference to those invoices. [Taxpayer Ex. 34]

² Taxpayer Ex. 22, Note b, reflects a slightly different number resulting from a computation error. The sum of \$310,270.65, \$802,787.50, \$310,270.65, and \$572,500.00 is \$1,995,828.80. Taxpayer's Note b states that the sum of the same figures is \$1,995,582.80. The correction reduces Taxpayer's total gross receipts in the amount \$522,564.86 instead of the amount stated in Note b (\$522,318.86) although this correction does not affect the grand total "per Taxpayer" on Taxpayer Ex. 22.

⁴ Taxpayer Ex. 35, Note d, indicates that gross receipts should be reduced by \$1,711.53. However, it appears that this was most likely an error because the correct figure is \$711.53. This correction does not affect the grand total "per Taxpayer" on Taxpayer Ex. 35.

under Regulation 3.1.6.13 NMAC, the presumption of correctness under Section 7-1-17 (C) also extends to the Department's assessment of penalty and interest. *See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue*, 2006-NMCA-050, ¶16, 139 N.M. 498, 134 P.3d 785 (agency regulations interpreting a statute are presumed proper and are to be given substantial weight).

For that reason, the presumption in favor of the Department requires that Taxpayer carry the burden to present countervailing evidence or legal argument to show that it is entitled to an abatement of an assessment. *See N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Casias Trucking*, 2014-NMCA-099, ¶8, 336 P.3d 436. "Unsubstantiated statements that the assessment is incorrect cannot overcome the presumption of correctness." *See MPC Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13, 133 N.M. 217, 62 P.3d 308; *See also* Regulation 3.1.6.12 NMAC. If a taxpayer presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, then the burden shifts to the Department to re-establish the correctness of the assessment. *See MPC*, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13.

In circumstances where a taxpayer's claim for relief relies on the application of an exemption or deduction, then "the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." *See Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation and Revenue Department*, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649 (internal citation omitted); *See also TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶9, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474.

Gross Receipts Tax

For the privilege of engaging in business, New Mexico imposes a gross receipts tax on the receipts of any person engaged in business. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-4 (2002). Under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (1) (2007), "gross receipts" is defined to mean:

the total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico, from leasing or licensing property employed in New Mexico, from granting a right to use a franchise employed in New Mexico, from selling services performed outside New Mexico, the product of which is initially used in New Mexico, or from performing services in New Mexico.

(Emphases Added)

Under the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, all gross receipts of a person engaged in business are presumed taxable. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-5 (2002). Despite the general presumption of taxability, taxpayers may also avail themselves of the benefits of various deductions or exemptions, if applicable, or even assert that its receipts are entirely excludable from taxation under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5.

If a taxpayer's claim for relief relies on the application of an exemption or deduction, then "the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." *See Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation and Revenue Department*, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649 (internal citation omitted); *See also TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶9, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474.

Discussion of Taxpayer's Documentary Evidence

Prior to evaluating the correctness of the Department's assessment and the potential application of any relevant deduction, exemption, or exclusion, the Hearing Officer elects to address the Department's arguments leveled at the adequacy of Taxpayer's evidence. The Department asserts that regardless of how the law governing this protest is eventually construed, Taxpayer's protest should be denied for the alleged inadequacy of its evidence.

In specific opposition to the applicability of NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-57, the Department

begins by criticizing the quality and quantity of Taxpayer's records. It argues that Taxpayer should not be entitled to a deduction because Taxpayer allegedly failed to provide non-taxable transactions certificates ("NTTC" or "NTTCs") or other evidence acceptable to the secretary, as required by the statute, to prove that various sales were made to out-of-state buyers and that the initial use of the product of the service was made outside New Mexico. The Department also directs criticism at the form of Taxpayer's evidence, indicating that "Taxpayer's case at the hearing relied on Excel spreadsheets, without any supporting documentation." *See Taxation and Revenue Department's Closing Argument*, Page 1.

The Hearing Officer finds the Department's critique to be unwarranted for at least two reasons. First, the Department's audit narrative expresses no criticism in reference to the quality or quantity of Taxpayer's records. In fact, given the opportunity to detail "Records Requested Not Provided[,]" the auditor stated, "N/A." *See* Department Ex. A-001. The Hearing Officer construes "N/A" as an abbreviation for "not applicable." *See* Black's Law Dictionary, 1119 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, "N/A" signifies, in the present context, that all records requested were provided.

In fact, a closer reading of the audit narrative reveals no concern with the overall quantity or quality of Taxpayer's records⁵ and there is no suggestion that the deduction under Section 7-9-57 was denied for that reason. *See* Department Ex. A-002. This observation is significant because it suggests that perhaps the sufficiency of Taxpayer's records was not a matter of genuine concern to the Department, at least not until the protest stage.

Furthermore, the Department apparently relied on the same documents to assess Taxpayer in the first place. It is contradictory to rely on Taxpayer's records to compute and assess a liability on

⁵ The audit narrative at Department Ex. A-002 suggests that the records provided for tax year 2013 were incomplete. The specifics of this issue are addressed in a subsequent discussion in which the Hearing Officer concluded that the records were not incomplete, but that data was likely overlooked due to user error.

one hand, and then condemn the quality of those same documents when presented by the Taxpayer in defense of the assessment. This leads to the Department's other argument in reference to the adequacy of Taxpayer's records, which is directed at its reliance on spreadsheets in supposed disregard of any underlying supporting documents.

Considering the abundance of records at issue, it was not unreasonable for the Department at the time of the audit, nor for the Hearing Officer at the hearing, to rely on spreadsheets summarizing the numerous transactions at issue. A review of the spreadsheets reveals that they contain *tens of thousands* of lines of data. In fact, the spreadsheets contained so much data, that Ms. Couch had to separate them into several distinct files. Requiring Taxpayer to present underlying documents on every transaction, or to substantiate or detail every line of data, would have been unreasonable.

Although the Rules of Evidence are not applicable to hearings under the Administrative Hearings Office Act or the Tax Administration Act, the Hearing Officer has often referred to them for guidance. In this case, the Rules of Evidence permit a proponent to use a "summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court." In such cases, "[t]he proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place." *See* Rule 11-1006, NMRA 2020. When summaries are therefore proffered in a manner consistent with Rule 11-1006, a qualified individual may testify to a summary of voluminous records which that person has examined without requiring that the records be presented in court. *See State v. Schrader*, 1958-NMSC-056, ¶¶11-14, 64 N.M. 100, 324 P.2d 1025. This is precisely what occurred in this protest.

Ms. Couch presented as qualified, competent, and credible to address Taxpayer's records and the spreadsheets she prepared to summarize them. As of the date of the hearing, she had worked

for Taxpayer for nearly 25 years and was extraordinarily conversant in every detail in the spreadsheets and the underlying records which they summarized. She even retained the services of an expert to assist in compiling portions of the underlying data into spreadsheets that might maximize the ability of the Department and the Hearing Officer to examine and comprehend the data.

The record is devoid of any prior assertion that the underlying records were not previously made available for the Department's review, and as previously explained, the audit narrative made no reference to documents being requested which were not actually provided. In fact, the Department's closing argument acknowledges that "[t]he Department prepared its work papers based on the invoices requested from, and provided by, Taxpayer." *See Taxation and Revenue Department's Closing Argument*, Page 1.

At a minimum, this statement signifies that Taxpayer made the underlying records available for examination, copying, or both, although the audit refers only to "Transaction Detail" and "Transaction Summary Report." In any event, this is significant because it suggests that the Department had a previous opportunity to evaluate Taxpayer's invoices and scrutinize the trustworthiness of its spreadsheets, even if the invoices were not separately proffered at the hearing.

Therefore, if the Department had any quarrels with the trustworthiness or reliability of invoices it did review, or with the accuracy of the subsequent spreadsheets, it did not raise those concerns in the audit or during the hearing. Instead, all exhibits, including the spreadsheets with which the Department now takes issue, were admitted into the evidentiary record without objection. This is notable because a party opposing introduction of a summary in lieu of the underlying records is obligated to object. *See State v. Peke*, 1962-NMSC-033, ¶ 33, 70 N.M. 108, 371 P.2d 226.

Under the circumstances of this protest, it was reasonable for Taxpayer to rely on summaries

For the stated reasons, the Department's assertions regarding the adequacy of Taxpayer's evidence, as presented in its written closing statement, are not well taken.

Taxpayer's Business Activities

Taxpayer focuses on two categories of service that it provides to its clients. The first category involves preparation of title reports at the request of its clients. The clients use the reports to assist in evaluating prospects that could be located inside or outside of New Mexico. It asserts that the reports are delivered to the location of its client's headquarters, usually to the attention of the client's company landman.

The second category of services concerns lease negotiations. The work might be performed in any location where the interested parties and field landmen are located. The location where the work is performed is not necessarily tied to the location of the prospect. As Mr. Jennings explained, the locations of interested parties may be dispersed widely across many state and foreign boundaries. Regardless of which category of service is being provided, Taxpayer may utilize the services of field landmen either inside or outside of New Mexico since a significant amount of the work can be performed remotely given the convenience of the internet and other electronic methods

or a lease, or the "procurement and management of independent contractor landmen, and the performance of administrative tasks necessary to support the work of those landmen." *See Taxation and Revenue Department's Closing Argument*, Page 2.

Product of Taxpayer's Service

Pinpointing the product of Taxpayer's service is critical because the nature of the final product will determine how and where it is delivered. The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that "the 'product' [of a service] is the 'direct result' or 'consequence' flowing from the service." *See TPL, Inc.*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶12 *citing TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2000-NMCA-083, ¶13, 129 N.M. 539, 10 P.3d 863. As in *TPL*, the Hearing Officer will ascertain the "product of the service" by identifying the benefit the buyer received for the consideration paid. *See TPL, Inc.* 2003-NMSC-007, ¶12 *citing ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1998-NMCA-078, ¶11, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969.

The evidence established that Taxpayer's clients paid for reports containing information that would inform and aid its decision-making processes. Whatever action the client took next in reference to a prospect was mostly irrelevant so long as that action was informed by Taxpayer's product. However, if the result was to pursue a lease with Taxpayer's assistance, then a subsequent product for the consideration paid was the benefit of utilizing Taxpayer's research and resources to communicate with interested parties with the objective of obtaining a lease for property rights. Obviously, not every attempt to secure a lease would be successful, so the final product of Taxpayer's lease acquisition services cannot necessarily be measured by the number of fully executed leases. However, the Hearing Officer concurs with Taxpayer in finding that the product of its services was reports, leases, or at a minimum, the effort devoted to acquiring a lease, even if that effort was unsuccessful.

The Hearing Officer is unpersuaded by the Department's characterization of Taxpayer's services as the procurement and management of independent contractor landmen, or the performance of administrative tasks necessary to support the work of those landmen. Taxpayer's clients required and paid for title reports and when applicable, assistance in the acquisition of leases.

Place of Initial Use

At this juncture, the Department's perception of the product of Taxpayer's service refocuses on the location of the subject prospect in New Mexico. It argues that "[e]ven if the product of Taxpayer's services is interpreted to be the reports/leases, the 'initial use' of those is in New Mexico, and logically cannot be anywhere else." *See Taxation and Revenue Department's Closing Argument*, Page 5.

The New Mexico Supreme Court has explained that Section 7-9-57, "provides New Mexico businesses with a deduction from the gross receipts tax for services provided to out-of-state buyers. *Businesses are not eligible for the deduction, however, if the out-of-state buyer either makes initial use or takes delivery of the 'product of the service' in New Mexico.*" *See TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶1, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474 (Emphasis Added). Conversely, delivery of the product of the service or initial use must be made outside of New Mexico. The terms "initial use" or "initially used" mean "the first employment for the intended purpose[.]" *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3 (I) (2007).

The Department, admittedly relying on *dicta* in *TPL*, argues that initial use should be "imputed [to New Mexico] when real property is located within the state[,]" even if its owner were out-of-state. *See Taxation and Revenue Department's Closing Argument*, Page 5. The Department relies on the following statement from *TPL*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶23:

We do not agree that a buyer's use within the state can be imputed from the presence of personal property shipped into the state, as it

can when real property is located within the state. An out-of-state buyer does not automatically make initial use or take delivery of services within New Mexico when services are performed upon its personal property sent to New Mexico. To the extent that [*Reed v. Jones*, 1970-NMCA-050, 81 N.M. 481, 468 P.2d 882] suggests otherwise, we now clarify that the buyer must perform some identifiable activity within the state that constitutes initial use or acceptance of delivery.

However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that *TPL* intended this statement to apply in the manner the Department suggests under these circumstances. The Department in *TPL* was arguing that "a buyer who is not personally present within the state and has no employees or agents within the state can still make initial use or take delivery of the product of service within the state." The Department in *TPL* relied on several examples of nonresidents engaging New Mexico businesses to provide services on their property in New Mexico. The Court summarized those examples, which in each instance involved a New Mexico business hired to provide services to an out-of-state buyer on real property owned by the buyer in New Mexico: lawn mowing services; a plumber hired to remove a clog from a sink; a carpet cleaning service hired to remove dirt from a carpet; a landscaping service hired to remove a tree from outside a home; or a crew hired to remove asbestos from a building. *See TPL*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶21.

Yet, *TPL* explained "the key factor in any of these scenarios is the necessity that the services be performed upon the real property within New Mexico. The property owner, even if not personally present in New Mexico, would take delivery of the service at his or her real property within New Mexico, and would make use of the service, either personally or through an agent, at the real property in New Mexico." *See TPL*, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶21.

In this case, however, Taxpayer's clients do not own the prospects subject of their inquiries, and, unlike the examples in *TPL*, Taxpayer is not performing services *on real property owned*, *or even leased*, *by a client*. It is researching public title records, sometimes in person or sometimes

remotely, communicating with property owners sometimes located in New Mexico, but not always, or assisting with other tasks necessary for securing leasing rights for its clients, from wherever a field landman happens to be located. Taxpayer is not excavating land, surveying boundaries, drilling wells, maintaining structures, or providing other types of services on real property in New Mexico owned or even leased by its clients. For this reason, the Department's reliance on the quoted passage from TPL is unavailing. As Taxpayer suggests, if its clients already owned or leased the prospects subject of their inquiries, then its title or lease acquisition services would be wholly unnecessary to those clients. See Taxpayer's Response to Department's Closing Statement, Page 4.

In any event, the Department claims that Regulation 3.2.215.11 (B) NMAC supports its position stating that even if review and acceptance occurs outside of New Mexico, the initial use may only occur in New Mexico because it is directly tied to land in New Mexico. The example cited by the Department provides:

X, an architect, prepares in New Mexico plans for a construction project to be built in New Mexico. On completion of the plans, X delivers the plans outside of New Mexico to the project owner for the owner's review and acceptance. After accepting the plans, the owner delivers the plans to the construction contractor who uses the plans during the construction of the project in New Mexico. Since the intended purpose of architectural plans is to serve as instructions for construction of a project, the initial use of the plans occurred when the contractor used the plans during the actual construction of the project in New Mexico. Therefore, X's receipts for preparing architectural plans for a construction project to be built in New Mexico are not deductible under the provisions of Section 7-9-57 NMSA 1978.

This example fails to reinforce the Department's position because the objective of any title report was to inform a decision that was made from a client's out-of-state headquarters, and reports were initially used for that intended purpose. Clients did not merely "review or accept" the reports from their out-of-state locations and then return them to New Mexico for use, as presented in the example. Instead, the client's review satisfied the intended purpose of the report by informing the

decision that the client's executive team would make from its out-of-state headquarters.

If the services involved acquisition of leasing rights, then the product of Taxpayer's service was to support the client's undertaking through various means facilitating acquisition of the lease. The support was delivered to the location where the benefit could be enjoyed, usually to the company headquarters and company landman. If lease acquisition efforts were successful, then the result might be acquisition of a lease vesting the client with legal authority to exercise control over whatever rights were conferred by the lease. See e.g. Quantum Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-050, ¶9, 125 N.M. 49, 956 P.2d 848; Cutter Flying Serv. v. Prop. Tax Dep't, 1977-NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 91 N.M. 215, 572 P.2d 943. However, surely not all lease acquisition efforts would succeed, in which case the final product might be viewed only as the effort, even if unsuccessful, that was devoted to the acquisition. But, in scenarios where leases were successfully acquired, mere possession of the rights conferred by those leases should qualify as initial use in the places from which the client's possessed their authority to exercise control. Subsequent actions exerting the rights conferred by the lease would constitute subsequent uses.

The fact that the products of Taxpayer's services might be joined to land in New Mexico does not necessarily establish the basis to impose gross receipts tax on Taxpayer, as the Department suggests without any significant legal analysis. Consider the regulatory example of a writer who drafted a manuscript about deer hunting in New Mexico, which was purchased by an out-of-state publisher. *See* Regulation 3.2.215.10 (B) NMAC. The example concludes by stating the writer's receipts would be deductible upon proper documentation. The example does not assert that because the manuscript is relevant *only to hunting deer in New Mexico*, and is therefore also tied to land in New Mexico, that the initial use of the product of the service should be imputed to New Mexico, and the writer should owe gross receipts tax. Yet, deer hunting in New Mexico similarly shares a

The Hearing Officer finds this example to be instructive, particularly with respect to the suggestion that the connection to land in New Mexico should be the prevailing factor in determining whether receipts derived from prospects in New Mexico are deductible. The hypothetical writer, similar to Taxpayer, performed a service, the product of which was delivered out of New Mexico for its initial use for its intended purpose. The hypothetical buyer of that product, similar to Taxpayer's clients, then utilized that product to derive some financial gain from a natural resource in New Mexico. The Department's position fails for inconsistency to the extent it claims Taxpayer's services should be taxable because of their connection to land in New Mexico, but the hypothetical writer's services, which also share a connection to land in New Mexico, should be deductible.

The evidence established to the satisfaction of the Hearing Officer, that Taxpayer's clients retained Taxpayer to research and report title information on prospects. The products of Taxpayer's services were subsequently delivered out-of-state where the client relied on the product to make informed decisions regarding New Mexico prospects, or in the case of a lease, enjoyed possession of the rights it conferred, or in the case of an unsuccessful acquisition, the benefit of Taxpayer's effort. Taxpayer was therefore entitled to a deduction under Section 7-9-57, and there was no basis to deny the deduction under the circumstances due to a perceived connection to the land.

NTTCs or Other Evidence Acceptable to the Secretary

The Department maintained that Taxpayer's claim to a deduction under Section 7-9-57 could not overcome its perceived lack of NTTCs or "other evidence acceptable to the secretary."

Although it is accurate that the Taxpayer did not present any NTTCs at the hearing, that does not establish that it failed to present "other evidence acceptable to the secretary" at the time of the audit.

Department Ex. D-014 appears to substantiate the Department's satisfaction with the quality of

Likewise, for reasons previously discussed, it was also entirely reasonable for Taxpayer at the hearing to rely on its many spreadsheets to establish the locations of its clients and the locations to which the products of its services were delivered. Yet again, Taxpayer's spreadsheets under the circumstances presented by this protest are permitted under the rules of evidence in both our state and federal district courts. *See* NMRA 2020, Rule 11-1006; USCS Fed Rules Evid R 1006. The spreadsheets were trustworthy and reliable and essentially substituted for the records the Department asserts were lacking, consistent with Rule 11-1006. Had the Department held the slightest apprehension about their reliability, then it surely would have introduced evidence to illustrate the basis for its concerns, or even object. That, however, did not happen.

Taxpayer's summaries, given their established foundation as well as the lack of any dispute regarding their trustworthiness and reliability also satisfy the requirements of Regulation 3.2.215.10 (A) NMAC on their own accord. That regulation explains "'other evidence acceptable to the secretary' includes invoices, contracts, photostatic copies of checks and letters which show that the sale is to an out-of-state buyer and which indicate that the initial use of the product of the service did not occur in New Mexico." Although the examples provided by the regulation to not explicitly reference spreadsheets such as those proffered in this case, the Hearing Officer noted the Department's use of "include" which Black's Law Dictionary, 531 (9th ed. 2009), defines as "[t]o contain as a part of something." It continues to explain that "[t]he participle *including* typically

indicates a partial list" and that "some drafters use phrases such as *including without limitation* and *including but not limited to* – which mean the same thing." (Emphasis in Original).

Consistent with that definition, New Mexico courts and numerous other jurisdictions have also recognized that:

A term whose statutory definition declares what it "includes" is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than where the definition declares what a term "means." It has been said "the word 'includes' is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation. It, therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated."

See Mechant Bank & Trust Co. v. Meyer (In re Estate of Corwin), 1987-NMCA-100, ¶3, 106 N.M. 316, 317, 742 P.2d 528, 529, quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction Section 47.07 (Sands 4th ed. 1984); citing Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1, 86 L.Ed. 65 (1941); Smyers v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 157 Cal.App.3d 36, 203 Cal.Rptr. 521 (1984); Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Hawaii 25, 564 P.2d 135 (1977); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.1983).

As previously discussed, the spreadsheets underpinning Taxpayer's protest include all details essential to establishing Taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction, and also permits an auditor, or the Hearing Officer under the present circumstances to filter and sort data in order to view receipts deriving from services sold and delivered to out-of-state buyers. This is equivalent to the sort of detailed accounting referenced in Regulation 3.2.215.10 (C) (1) (c) NMAC, but on a larger scale.

The Department through its cross examination of Ms. Couch acknowledged that it possessed a sample of Taxpayer's invoices and selected one invoice, presumably at random, which Ms. Couch easily located in the spreadsheets and discussed in detail. The Department did not subsequently express any concerns or communicate any irregularities or errors between that invoice and its

corresponding entry in the spreadsheet, which the Hearing Officer perceived as further validation of the spreadsheet's accuracy. *See* Record of Hearing, Part 2 of 2, 00:51:00 – 00:57:30.

The Hearing Officer was persuaded that Taxpayer provided other evidence that should have been satisfactory to the secretary, and which the Department, in fact, did accept. For a second time, Taxpayer provided "other evidence [that should have been] acceptable to the secretary" in the form of its detailed spreadsheets which itemized the facts upon which its entitlement to a deduction under Section 7-9-57 should rest, the accuracy of which was never in dispute. The Department's arguments directed at the lack of NTTCs or "other evidence acceptable to the secretary" are not well taken.

In-State Presence of Client/Buyer

The Department also suggested through its examination of Ms. Griego that delivery of a product of services might also be imputed to New Mexico if the client entity maintained a business location in New Mexico. Although the Department devoted little effort to developing this argument, the Hearing Officer will nevertheless point out that Regulation 3.2.215.12 (B) NMAC speaks quite clearly to that possibility. That regulation demonstrates that the critical factor is not whether a taxpayer has a presence in the state, but the location where the product of the service was delivered and initially used for its intended purpose. In other words, a taxpayer would not be disqualified from obtaining the deduction if a buyer maintained an office in New Mexico so long as the product of the service was delivered outside of New Mexico where the buyer made its initial use for its intended purpose.

Beneficiaries of Section 7-9-57

Finally, the Department asserts that Taxpayer is not entitled to the benefit of a deduction under Section 7-9-57 because it is not an intended beneficiary of the deduction. Again, the argument

is unsupported by any significant legal analysis or other evidence. Taxpayer responded that Department's understanding of the Legislature's intentions is misinformed and mistaken.

New Mexico does not maintain a state-sponsored system for the recordation of legislative history. For that reason, New Mexico courts have abstained from divining what legislators read, heard, or thought as they deliberated any particular item of legislation, and have instructed that "[i]f the intentions of the Legislature cannot be determined from the actual language of a statute, then we resort to rules of statutory construction, not legislative history." *See Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers*, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶30, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236.

In construing a statute, the primary focus is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. "Our interpretation of legislative intent comes primarily from the language used by the legislature, and we will consider the ordinary meaning of such language unless a different intent is clearly expressed." *See Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs.*, 1992-NMSC-042, ¶12, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442.

Referring to the ordinary meaning of the language contained in Section 7-9-57, it is readily apparent that the Legislature did not single out categories of taxpayers which it thought should benefit from the deduction under Section 7-9-57 or conversely disqualify others. Taxpayer's entitlement to the deduction should not be curtailed by restrictions the Legislature did not explicitly and clearly include in the law. As such, there is no basis on which to conclude that Taxpayer is not an intended beneficiary and should therefore be disqualified from eligibility for the deduction when it has otherwise satisfied all other elements of the law.

This construction not only adheres to the longstanding and well-established rules of our courts in cases such as *Wing Pawn Shop* and *TPL*, but it also reflects "a fair, unbiased, and reasonable construction" consistent with *Chavez v. Comm'r of Revenue*, 1970-NMCA-116, ¶7,

1	82 N.M. 97, 476 P.2d 67. Clearly, had the Legislature intended to disqualify any class of
2	taxpayers, it would have done so. The Hearing Officer declines to read into the statute language
3	that the Legislature did not itself include, especially when the law makes sense as written." See
4	Cmtys. for Clean Water v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2018-NMCA-024, ¶14, 413
5	P.3d 877.
6	Construction of NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 and Section 7-9-3.5.
7	Although the Department perceives the primary issue in this protest as deriving from
8	Section 7-9-57, Taxpayer's protest also relies on the application of NMSA 1978, Sections 7-9-13.1
9	and 7-9-3.5.
10	When read in isolation, Section 7-9-3.5 (A) (1) establishes that services performed outside
11	New Mexico are taxable when the product of the service is initially used in New Mexico. However,
12	that portion of the definition of gross receipts is generally regarded as applying only to services in
13	the area of research and development since another statute, NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 (A),
14	specifically exempts "from gross receipts tax the receipts from selling services performed outside
15	New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico[,]" with the exclusion of
16	"research and development services[.]" See NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 (B).
17	The Department has acknowledged the relationship between Section 7-9-3.5 and Section 7-
18	9-13.1 on various occasions. In Regulation 3.2.1.18 (E) (1) NMAC, it stated that "[r]eceipts from
19	performing services, except research and development services, outside New Mexico are not subject
20	to the gross receipts tax under the provisions of Section 7-9-13.1 NMSA 1978." As previously
21	recognized, agency regulations interpreting a statute are presumed proper and are given
22	substantial weight. See Chevron U.S.A., 2006-NMCA-050, ¶16.

The Department has also distributed no less than two publications addressing the

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1	relationship between NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 and Section 7-9-13.1. In FYI-105 (Gross
2	Receipts & Compensating Taxes: An Overview), the Department summarized the general definition
3	of "gross receipts" as "the total amount of money or other consideration received from selling
4	property in New Mexico, leasing or licensing property employed in New Mexico, granting a right to
5	use a franchise employed in New Mexico, performing services in New Mexico or selling research
6	and development services performed outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in
7	New Mexico." See FYI-105, Rev. 05/18, Page 4 (Emphasis Added). This definition mostly adopted
8	the statutory definition of "gross receipts" contained in Section 7-9-3.5, with obvious deviation for
9	the purpose of incorporating the exemption contained in Section 7-9-13.1 (A).
10	Likewise, in FYI-270 (Information on Research and Development), the Department
11	explained that "[r]esearch and development services performed outside New Mexico the product of
12	which is initially used in New Mexico are subject to the gross receipts tax All other services
13	performed outside New Mexico are exempt from the gross receipts tax (Section 7-9-13.1)." See FYI-
14	270, Rev. 3/14, Page 4 (Emphasis Added).
15	Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the applicable statutes, regulations, and the
16	Department's publications establish a definite and unambiguous rule that services performed
17	outside New Mexico are exempt from the gross receipts tax, subject to an exception not germane to
18	the facts of this protest because Taxpayers were not engaged in research and development. Consider
19	Example 1 from FYI-270:
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	A Colorado architectural firm with a branch office in Las Cruces, New Mexico has been hired by a New Mexico client to design a building in Raton, New Mexico. The Colorado firm performs all the work in Colorado and upon completion of the architectural plans, sends them to its New Mexico client. Because the service is performed outside New Mexico but the product of the service is initially used (that is, first employed for its intended purpose) in New Mexico, the Colorado firm does have gross receipts in New Mexico.

Its receipts, however, are exempt from gross receipts tax under Section 7-9-13.1(A) NMSA 1978 because architectural design of a building is not a research and development service.

This example is comparable to scenarios in which Taxpayer's services are performed out-of-state and the product of the service is delivered in New Mexico, which momentarily shifts the Hearing Officer's attention back to Section 7-9-57 and the possibility that even if the products of Taxpayer's services were perceived as being delivered in New Mexico, because of their asserted connection to the land, Section 7-9-13.1 would nevertheless provide an exemption for the services that Taxpayer performed outside of New Mexico.

In any regard, the law clearly permits, and Taxpayer clearly established, entitlement to an exemption for services performed outside of New Mexico, even if the product of the service was initially used in New Mexico. *See* Section 7-9-13.1.

The Correctness of the Assessment

As explained, Taxpayer was entitled to the previously discussed deduction, exemption, and exclusion. The failure to adequately compute or credit those amounts is detrimental to the correctness of the Assessment.

Nevertheless, there are additional concerns which must also be addressed which similarly contradict the correctness of the Assessment. As previously discussed, Taxpayer disputes the way the Department extracted and interpreted invoice data from its spreadsheets. Ms. Couch credibly testified that in order to determine the location of services performed or delivery for initial use, the auditor only needed to refer to the location where the field landmen were based since that represented the location from which they performed services. Field landman locations were determined by referring to each field landman's IRS Form W-9 in each relevant year. Field landmen headquartered in New Mexico were presumed to also be performing services in New Mexico, and Taxpayer does not dispute the taxability of receipts from those services when the product of the

Out-of-state field landmen, on the other hand were presumed to be performing services from their out-of-state locations unless its invoices to the Taxpayer specified that costs had been incurred for travel to New Mexico. That would suggest that at least a portion of their services were performed in New Mexico. However, the Department interpreted travel to New Mexico as signifying that all services had been performed in New Mexico, rather than just a portion of services associated with the travel. Accordingly, the Department assessed gross receipts on 100 percent of the receipts even if only a fraction of the receipts were derived from services performed in New Mexico. Taxpayer, having concerns with the accuracy of the Department's methodology, encouraged it to review the more-detailed source data, but the Department declined. Taxpayer's request was not unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that Regulation 3.2.1.18 (C) NMAC permits the allocation of costs for identifying services performed in New Mexico and computing a corresponding amount of taxable receipts. *See* Regulation 3.2.1.18 NMAC.

Ms. Couch testified that it was imperative for the Department to evaluate the detailed invoices Taxpayer received from its field landmen, rather than rely solely on the invoices from Taxpayer to its clients. Invoices from field landmen specified details for the work performed on each individual prospect in contrast with invoices to Taxpayer's clients which aggregated data in a manner that obscured details necessary for a more precise tax computation. Ms. Couch credibly testified that she provided as much data as was requested and despite the best efforts of all involved, the Department may have overlooked, misunderstood, or disregarded feedback that could have aided its computations. For example, the Department may have unintentionally disregarded a significant amount of data because of an error filtering spreadsheet information. Yet, regardless of how the error occurred, this oversight represented an error that eventually merged with the final

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Moreover, it appeared that in tax year 2010, the Department's auditor was unable to account for the difference between gross receipts reported on Taxpayer's Form PTE-A and receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A). The auditor assertedly resolved the difference by imputing additional gross receipts when the evidence established that the most accurate method of computing gross receipts was by reference to Taxpayer's records, not its Form 2010 PTE-A. As Ms. Couch explained, the amount reported as gross receipts on Taxpayer's PTE-As in 2010 was not accurate for the purpose of computing Taxpayer's gross receipts tax liability because the PTE-A included receipts from services performed out of state.

Based on the foregoing, Taxpayer established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department's assessment was not correct. The evidence established errors or oversights that adversely effected the correctness of the audit and subsequent assessment. Moreover, Taxpayer demonstrated that its gross receipts tax liability could be accurately computed from its records, and did so in reliance on numerous spreadsheets, the reliability and accuracy of which was not disputed.

Taxpayer concedes that its taxable gross receipts are as follows, providing for all claimed exclusions, exemptions, and deductions, to which the Hearing Officer finds it should be entitled as discussed in previous sections: \$259,548.58 in 2010; \$623,655.13 in 2011; \$553,361.34 in 2012; \$175,164.25 in 2013; \$65,194.44 in 2014; and \$5,278.37 in 2015. [Taxpayer Ex. 14; *Taxpayer's Closing Argument*, Pages 8 – 9]

The Department's protest auditor, Ms. Griego, observed the testimony of every witness and from the Hearing Officer's perspective, appeared to diligently follow along with the discussion of all exhibits. When counsel for the Department asked her, whether based on Taxpayer's presentation of evidence, she believed any adjustments to the assessment could be warranted, she appeared to

1	carefully consider her response before candidly responding, "possibly, yes." See Record of Hearing	
2	Part 2 of 2, 01:01:17. Although Ms. Griego's response to that question is not an admission that the	
3	Department's Assessment was incorrect, it does tend to acknowledge the reasonableness of the	
4	Taxpayer's position and its analysis with which the Hearing Officer agrees.	
5	The Department did not re-establish the correctness of its assessment as provided by M.	
6	Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶ 13, 133 N.M. 217, 62 P.3d 308.	
7	Taxpayer's protest should be DENIED to the extent tax, interest, and penalty are due on	
8	those amounts of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and GRANTED with regard to all	
9	remaining issues.	
10	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW	
11	A. Taxpayer filed a timely, written protest to the Department's Assessment, and	
12	jurisdiction lies over the parties and the subject matter of the protest.	
13	B. A hearing was timely set and held within 90 days of Taxpayer's protest under	
14	NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (2015).	
15	C. Taxpayer carries the burden to present countervailing evidence or legal argument	
16	to show that it is entitled to an abatement of an assessment. See Casias Trucking, 2014-NMCA-	
17	099, ¶8.	
18	D. If a taxpayer presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, then the	
19	burden shifts to the Department to re-establish the correctness of the assessment. See MPC Ltd.,	
20	2003-NMCA-021, ¶13.	
21	E. Taxpayer rebutted the statutory presumption of correctness that attached to the	
22	Assessment under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17.	
23	F. The Department did not reestablish the correctness of the Assessment. <i>See MPC</i>	

H. Taxpayer is entitled to an exemption from gross reconstruction services performed outside the state, the product of which is initial NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1. I. Receipts from services both performed and delivered excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED			
H. Taxpayer is entitled to an exemption from gross reconservices performed outside the state, the product of which is initial NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1. I. Receipts from services both performed and delivered excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	ipts deriving from the sale of		
services performed outside the state, the product of which is initial NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1. I. Receipts from services both performed and delivered excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	services to an out-of-state buyer under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-57.		
NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1. I. Receipts from services both performed and delivered excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	ceipts for receipts derived from		
I. Receipts from services both performed and delivered excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	services performed outside the state, the product of which is initially used in New Mexico under		
excluded from gross receipts under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5. For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1.		
For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with	ed outside of New Mexico are		
of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with			
	For the foregoing reasons, Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED with respect to those amounts		
Taxpayer shall be liable for gross receipts tax, interest, and penal	of gross receipts it concedes are taxable and IS GRANTED with respect to all other issues.		
	ty on the following amounts of		
gross receipts, with appropriate credit for amounts payments prev	viously remitted: \$259,548.58 in		
13 2010; \$623,655.13 in 2011; \$553,361.34 in 2012; \$175,164.25 in	2010; \$623,655.13 in 2011; \$553,361.34 in 2012; \$175,164.25 in 2013; \$65,194.44 in 2014; and		
14 \$5,278.37 in 2015.			
15 DATED: February 7, 2020			
Chris Romero 18 Hearing Officer Administrative Hear 20 P.O. Box 6400 Santa Fe, NM 87502			

1 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 2 Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this 3 decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within 30 days of the 4 date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this 5 Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates 6 the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. 7 Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative 8 Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative 9 Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a 10 copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, 11 which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing 12 statement from the appealing party. See Rule 12-209 NMRA. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 13 14 On February 7, 2020, a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was submitted to the 15 parties listed below in the following manner: 16 First Class Mail Interagency Mail 17 INTENTIONALLY BLANK 18 19 John Griego 20 Legal Assistant Administrative Hearings Office 21 22 P.O. Box 6400 23 Santa Fe, NM 87502